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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON COMPETITION
By
XU TANG
August 2019
Committee Chair: Dr. David L. Sjoquist
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation examines how competition shapes behaviors of governments and
agents in different scenarios. Governments compete with each other to attract for mobile
tax base. Agents and workers face competition to earn prizes and bonus. Competition is
an effective way to incentivize proper behaviors. While in some cases, it causes inefficiency
and social welfare loss. This dissertation studies environmental regulatory competition, tax
competition, and tournament respectively.
The first essay explores the question of whether OECD countries engage in strategic
environmental policymaking and use environmental policies to compete for the investment.
I directly estimate countries’ strategic interaction, which is the causal effect of other
countries’ changes in environmental policies on one country’s environmental policy.
Considering that the strategic interaction can be caused by distinct mechanisms, such as
the coordination, competition for the investment, and pollution spillovers, this paper also
disentangles different mechanisms. This paper employs a new index on measuring countries’
environmental policy stringency and uses spatial econometrics with the Generalized
Methods of Moments continuously updated Instrumental Variables estimator. The panel
dataset includes 26 OECD countries for the period 1990 to 2012. I find that there is a
positive and statistically significant strategic interaction on environmental policy among
countries. Moreover, the strategic responses in environmental policymaking are more
evident among EU countries than others, and the strategic interaction is further reinforced
after adopting the euro as a common currency. Interjurisdictional competition and
transboundary pollution spillovers appear to play limited roles in causing the interaction.
Essay 2 uses laboratory experiments to explore governments’ tax policies when there is
tax competition. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first experiment paper on tax
competition. I design a set of experiments to examine the effects of several factors on tax
policies, such as the number of competing regions and the sensitivity of capital movement
to the tax rate change. I find that the number of competing regions have a significant and
direct impact on governments’ tax choices even keeping the sensitivity of capital movement
constant. This finding has not been predicted in the theoretical literature. The sensitivity
of capital movement also affect the tax rate choices, but the effect is not as large as the
model prediction. I also find the communication among competing regions significantly
improves the tax choices and bring about higher social welfare in general. The implications
of the results are two folds. The first is that when analyzing tax competition issues, both
from a policy perspective and theoretical study perspective, it is important to take the
effect of the number of competing regions into consideration. The second policy implication
is that it is helpful to promote better and more effective communication among
governments.
Essay 3 studies a multi-task tournament in which each agent undertakes two tasks. An
agent’s effort on one task creates externalities on the performance of the other task of the
agent as well as the performances of other competing agents. We discuss the design of an
optimal tournament to achieve a social optimum in the presence of such externalities. In
particular, we show that the traditional single-prized tournament is unable to elicit a social
optimum, while a task-specific, multi-prized tournament, which we propose in this paper,
can achieve socially optimal outcomes.
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Essay 1
Competition or Coordination: Strategic Environmental
Policymaking Across OECD Countries
1.1 Introduction
Given increasing globalization, the possibility exists that it sparks a “race to the
bottom” when governments set policies. A “race to the bottom” implies that governments
may choose low corporate tax rates, lax labor standards, and lax environmental standards
to compete for investment. Such a possibility raises substantial concerns that public
policies may not achieve social welfare maximization. Studies of public policy have found
reductions in corporation tax rates and labor standards which are consistent with the “race
to the bottom” hypothesis (Devereux et al., 2008; Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013; Olney,
2013). However, regarding environmental policymaking, the causal empirical evidence
among countries is still lacking.
In the literature (Millmet, 2014; Carruthers and Lamoreaux, 2016; Genschel and
Schwarz, 2011), a common way to study the “race to the bottom” hypothesis is to examine
its one prediction, whether jurisdictions engage in strategic policymaking. To be more
specific, the strategic policy interaction is the effect on one jurisdiction’s environmental
policy caused by other jurisdictions’ changes in environmental policies. But this effect can
be caused by distinct mechanisms. Besides the interjurisdictional competition that would
potentially cause “race to the bottom” (Oates and Schwab, 1988; Cerny 1994; Drezner
1
2001; Murphy 2006)1, other mechanisms include international coordination, pollution
spillovers, and others (Kennedy, 1994; Markusen et al., 1995; Besley and Case, 1995;
Brueckner, 2003). If the observed strategic interaction is not mainly caused by
interjurisdictional competition, without “race”, the “race to the bottom” would not
become a serious issue. However, there are very few empirical papers in the environmental
policy literature that disentangle the mechanism behind the effect and provide empirical
evidence on the potential causes. In addition, most of papers in the literature estimate
environmental interaction at the subnational level, such as across U.S. states (see
Fredriksson and Millimet 2002; Fredriksson et al. 2004; Levinson 2003). The evidence on
countries is limited. This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature. This paper
contributes to the literature by directly estimating the causal effect of other countries’
changes in environmental policies on one country’s policymaking. Considering that this
effect can be caused by distinct mechanisms, this paper also unpacks different underlying
mechanisms behind the interaction.
In the estimation of causal effect of other countries’ policy changes, I use instrument
variables to deal with the endogeneity issue due to the reverse causation. I use other
countries’ political characteristics as instruments for the environmental policies. Regarding
the distinct mechanisms, the first mechanism this paper explores is the possible
coordination and cooperation across countries in the European Union (EU). I separate
observations based on whether countries have EU membership and estimate the strategic
interactions among EU countries and non-EU countries respectively. I also explore the
effect of adopting the euro as a common currency on the policy interdependence among EU
countries. To differentiate the interactions caused by interjurisdictional competition, I
separate observations based on whether countries have tight capital control (Devereux et
al., 2008). Tight capital control restrains capital mobility, and thus the incentive to
compete by changing policy in response to another country’s policy change is greatly
1There are some excellent surveys on tax competition works (Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004;
Keen and Konard, 2013; Boadway and Tremblay, 2012).
2
diminished. If interjurisdictional competition plays a major role in the strategic interaction,
we would expect different interactions among countries without capital control than among
countries with capital control. The third potential mechanism of strategic interaction,
pollution spillovers across nations, is also explored. When pollution spillovers exist, other
jurisdictions’ environmental policies which have an impact on their own countries’ pollution
directly affect the receiving jurisdiction’s environmental quality. When the receiving
jurisdiction takes this spillover effect into account in the policy making (Kennedy, 1994;
Markusen et al., 1995), transboundary spillovers bring about a strategic interaction. To
separate the interaction caused by transboundary spillovers, I study the spillovers of
oxidized sulphur and control for the pollution transported from other jurisdictions. After
controlling for pollution spillovers, the coefficient on others’ environmental policies does not
estimate the strategic interaction through the spillovers mechanism2.
I find that a weighted average stringency of environmental policies in other countries
has a positive and statistically significant causal impact on the home country’s policy
stringency. The coefficient is 1.064 when GDP per capita is used as the weight. As with
the analysis on EU and non-EU countries, I find that EU countries’ environmental policies
have a positive impact on both other EU and non-EU countries. Moreover, when the home
country is in the EU, it reacts more to other EU countries than to non-EU countries. The
strong policy interaction across EU countries may indicate the coordination efforts. Also,
this strategic interaction becomes stronger after adopting the euro as a common currency.
Regarding differentiating interjurisdictional competition, empirical results show the
strategic interaction among countries without tight capital control is not statistically
different from the interaction among countries with capital control. This result indicates
that interjurisdictional competition plays a limited role behind the environmental policy
interdependence. Regarding transboundary spillovers, the results show that pollution from
2One related paper is Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg (2003), which explores the effect of transbound-
ary pollution spillovers on environmental treaty participation using 25 European countries’ cross-section
data. My paper combines the method in Murdoch et al. (2003) and spatial econometrics to disentangle the
interaction brought about by transboundary spillovers.
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other countries has a positive effect on the receiving country’s environmental policy
stringency, indicating that cross-border spillovers play a role in the environmental
policymaking process. The scale of impact of pollution spillovers on environmental policy
interaction is relatively small, though.
It is important to study strategic interactions among countries besides among
subnational governments, such as U.S. states. Countries play an important role in
combating pollution, reducing emissions and promoting environmental protection.
Moreover, the behavior of countries may show different interaction pattern for the following
reasons. First, countries have more discretion in deciding environmental policies as
compared with subnational governments. There is no powerful central authority for
countries as there is when considering state governments. Even though there are some
supranational organizations, such as the European Union, the delegation of environmental
authority is mainly of member countries (Principle of Subsidiarity). Second, the movement
of resources, such as capital, has more friction across countries than within a country
because of different cultures, languages, legal environments, and possible trade barriers.
The increase in movement resistance may affect the reaction of capital flows with respect
to environmental policy, which in turn affects the interjurisdictional competition pattern.
Finally, political considerations, such as national images, responsibilities, and pressures
from other countries3 could also play a role in policy decisions at the country level.
One reason for the limited national level analysis of environmental policy is the lack of
measure of environmental policy which is appropriate and comparable across countries and
has longitudinal data. Studies tend to use proxies to measure environmental policy
stringency. For example, Kellenberg (2009) uses survey questions from the Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR), which were answered by business executives. Davies and
Naughton (2014) use the number of environmental treaties a country has ratified as a
measure of environmental policy. Cole et al. (2006) and Cole and Fredriksson (2009) use
3One example is that after President Trump declared to withdraw U.S. from the Paris Climate Accord
on June, 2017, global debates, criticisms even outrages are provoked.
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grams of lead content per gallon of gasoline as a proxy, while Mulatu et al. (2010) employ
an Environmental Sustainability Index. These indicators tend to measure policy stringency
in one dimension, and also lack consistency4. In this paper, I use a new composite index,
namely Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) developed by the OECD (Botta and
Kozluk, 2014). This index attempts to capture the multidimensionality of regulations and
improve cross-country comparisons. Both market-based and non-market-based policy
instruments are considered5.
Differentiating the underlying mechanisms for the strategic interaction helps us to
better understand the stringency of environmental policy that is adopted. My empirical
results do not support the position that interjurisdictional competition plays a significant
role in setting a country’s environmental policies. If interjurisdictional competition is
limited, the possibility of a “race to the bottom” would not be a serious concern.
Carruthers and Lamoreaux (2016) also support this view after a detailed review of the
related literature on the environmental regulation competition. The limited impact of
interjurisdictional competition on environmental policy stands in contrast with corporate
tax interaction; Devereux et al. (2008) find that reductions in equilibrium tax rates can be
explained almost entirely by intense competition across countries. The contrasting impact
of interjurisdictional competition on environmental policy or corporate taxation could
partly explain the distinct trends in the two policies.
There is a possibility that the estimates in this paper are biased by the presence of
unobserved shocks, and the results merely demonstrate a co-movement across countries’
environmental policies. This paper utilizes several ways to address this. First, I construct
instrumental variables for the main independent variable of interest, other countries’
environmental policies. I use other countries’ political characteristics to construct
4Brunel and Levinson (2013) provide a review and comparison on different measures.
5The OECD EPS database contains information on 15 different environmental policy instruments im-
plemented in OECD countries, which include both Non-Market Based (NMB) and Market Based (MB)
instruments. EPS has been used to in other papers, such as Albrizio et al. (2016). In addition, the credibil-
ity of EPS has been confirmed by comparisons with other measures of environmental policy stringency, such
as Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) responses.
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instruments, and the results of econometric tests confirm the validity and relevance of my
instruments. Second, I control for time fixed effects, country fixed effects and
country-specific time trend to absorb time-specific common shocks, country permanent
characteristics, as well as policy trend that is specific to each country. Third, to confirm
the credibility of my estimates, I present a number of specification tests and robustness
checks to further probe the validity of the estimates. I utilize four different weighting
schemes to construct the weighted average of other countries’ environmental policies, and
the results of positive strategic interaction are consistent across different weights.
Moreover, to check the robustness of estimates, control variables are one-year, two-year,
and three-year lagged, respectively. Considering that environmental policy usually changes
progressively, I also control for the one-year lagged dependent variable in one robustness
check and find that there is still positive strategic interaction across countries. In another
robustness check, I recalculate the measure on the environmental policy (EPS) to exclude
the potential correlation across countries in the calculation of EPS and find that the
positive interaction still exists.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides a theoretical framework
for the empirical approach. Section 1.3 describes both the empirical specifications and
data. Results and robustness checks are presented in sections 1.4 and 2.6, respectively.
Section 1.6 presents discussions and conclusions.
1.2 The Model
To frame the empirical analysis, this section presents a simple model of a jurisdiction’s
choice of environmental policy. Governments strategically interact on environmental
policymaking due to the existence of interjurisdictional competition and transboundary
pollution spillovers. Besides these two mechanisms of strategic policy interaction, another
possible mechanism is coordination and cooperation, which is not considered in the current
6
model. However, the model can be easily generalized to incorporate other mechanisms.
The main purposes of the model are to provide intuition on how the two mechanisms affect
government’s policy strategic interactions and provide theoretical foundations for the
econometric models.
This model is based on the canonical model of interjurisdictional competition (Oates
and Schwab, 1988) and extends Oates and Schwab by considering transboundary pollution
spillovers. In this model, the government in each jurisdiction devises environmental policy
to maximize local social welfare.
1.2.1 Social Welfare and Production
Assume there are n jurisdictions. For each jurisdiction, the social welfare is modeled as
the utility of a single representative agent, i, who resides in the jurisdiction. This agent get
utility from consuming a composite private good, denoted by ci, and consuming a local
public good gi. This resident also suffers from local environmental damage ei. The utility
can thus be denoted as:
ui(ci, gi, ei; X˜i) (1.2.1)
where X˜i is a vector of other characteristics of jurisdiction i. The utility function is
increasing and concave in ci and gi, and it is decreasing and convex in ei The marginal
utilities of the private good and public good are positive, respectively uic > 0 and uig > 0,
while the marginal utility of environmental damage is negative, uie < 0. We make no
assumptions about the cross-partial. The utility function may differ across jurisdictions.
The production process in jurisdiction i uses capital Ki and some immobile factor,
which are assumed to be labor Li. Assume that all residents work for simplicity. Thus Li is
also the number of residents. Local environmental policy, Qi also affects local productive
activity. Posit that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. The
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production function is:
Y =Fi(Ki, Li, Qi)
=LiFi(Ki/Li, 1, Qi/Li)
=Lifi(ki, qi)
(1.2.2)
where y = fi(ki, qi) is the output per person. ki denote the amount of capital per
person employed in locality i. In the production function, besides capital, the
environmental policy also has effect on the output. Take one type of environmental policy,
“cap and trade” as example. Assume that local government uses “cap and trade” to
regulate emissions. In this case, government sets a total limit on aggregate allowable
emissions. The stringency of environmental policy affects the amount of allowable
emissions. Larger amounts of allowable emissions means less abatement and higher optimal
output for firms and thus higher output per person in local jurisdiction. To simplify the
interpretation, let qi be the total allowable emissions per person in jurisdiction i. Also,
assume that the amount of allowable emissions is equal to the amount of actual emissions
because environmental law is perfectly enforced and the allowable emission limit is binding.
Let’s assume a well-behaved neoclassical production function exhibiting constant
returns to scale in all factors, with fi increasing and strictly concave in the amount of
capital and allowable emissions. This means fik > 0 > fikk and fiq > 0 > fiqq. An increase
in qi raises the marginal product of capital, fikq > 0. The production functions may differ
across jurisdictions; the technologies are not necessarily identical.
1.2.2 Mechanism 1: Interjurisdictional Competition
The n jurisdictions interact with each other. One mechanism behind the interaction is
interjurisdictional competition for mobile capital. Governments set policies to compete for
capital which is freely mobile among jurisdictions and fixed at the national level. Let ki
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denote the stock of capital per person with which residents of jurisdiction i are endowed.
The allocation of capital satisfies the following capital market clear condition:
∑
i
ki ∗ Li =
∑
i
ki ∗ Li (1.2.3)
Jurisdictions have an incentive to compete for capital because it contributes to social
welfare in two aspects. First, capital is a production factor, and it increases output and
therefore local consumption of the composite private good. We know that the total value of
private good production is fi(ki), and the gross return per unit of capital is fik(ki). Thus
the total return to the immobile factor, labor, and permitted emissions of production is
fi(ki)− kifik(ki), which is labor income of the representative resident. Residents also
receive income from their endowment of capital rki, where r is the net return to capital.
The private good consumption of the representative resident in jurisdiction i is:
ci = fi(ki)− kifik(ki) + rki (1.2.4)
The second way through which capital promotes social welfare is that taxes on capital
generate government revenue to finance public goods. Local government levies taxes on
capital at tax rate ti and spend government expenditures on the local public good:
gi = tiki (1.2.5)
Since capital contributes to the private goods consumption and public goods provision,
governments has an incentive to compete for the capital. And the movement of capital
follows the rule that the net return to capital must be equal across jurisdictions in
equilibrium:
fik − ti = r ∀i (1.2.6)
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Given the above capital mobility constraint, government in locality i is able to
compete for a larger amount of mobile capital through adjusting two policy instruments.
One is to reduce tax rate ti and the other is to increase the allowable emissions qi to
increase fik, which means lower environmental standard. Since the net return to capital r
is affected by other jurisdictions’ policies, in order to attract the amount of capital that
maximizes its social welfare, each government would strategically set its own policies in
response to other jurisdictions’ policies. See section 3.1.4 for the formal derivation.
1.2.3 Mechanism 2: Transboundary Pollution Spillovers
Another mechanism that drives the strategic interaction across jurisdictions is
transboundary pollution spillovers. Environmental damage ei in jurisdiction i is linked to
the pollutant emissions not only of those from its own jurisdiction, but also those spilled
over from neighboring jurisdictions. From section 3.1.1, we know that the actual pollutant
emissions in jurisdiction i is equal to the permitted emissions qi. Assume that each unit of
emission orginated from jurisdiction i deposits αi percentage in its own jurisdiction. Each
unit of emission originated from jurisdiction j deposits βij percentage to jurisdiction i.
Thus, the pollution depositions in jurisdiction i is the sum of those from its own emissions
αiqi and those transmitted from all other jurisdictions
∑
j 6=i
βijqj. The environmental damage
can be written as a function of pollution depositions:
ei = ei(αiqi +
∑
j 6=i
βijqj) (1.2.7)
where αi, βij ∈ [0, 1]. Assume the environmental damage function ei to be increasing and
strictly convex in the amount of pollution depositions. This means eiq, eiqq > 0.
Note that this equation reflects two types of spillovers. One type is represented by
1− αi, which is the fraction of emissions that are not deposited on own locality, meaning
the fraction of emissions that spill out to other jurisdictions or public areas (such as public
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sea). Let’s call this type of spillovers ”spill-out” for the rest of this paper. The second type
is
∑
j 6=i
βijqj, which reflects neighbors’ pollution which flowed into one’s jurisdiction. We use
”spill-in” to refer to this type.
When transboundary pollution spillovers exist, the environmental quality in
jurisdiction i is directly influenced by other jurisdictions’ environmental policies. To achieve
the optimal level of environmental quality, jurisdiction i thus adjusts its environmental
policy based on other jurisdictions’ policies; it forms a policy strategic interdependence.
1.2.4 Strategic Interaction on Environmental Policy
The government in each jurisdiction has discretion on two policy instruments: capital
taxation and environmental policy. Given government policies, other resource allocation
decisions are made by private-sector agents operating in competitive markets.
Governments choose capital tax rate and environmental policies to maximize the
equilibrium level of social welfare, that is, the utility of a representative resident.
max
ti,qi
[ui(ci, gi, ei; X˜i)] (1.2.8)
Substituting ci, gi, ei by using private goods consumption (1.2.4), public goods
provision (1.2.5) and environmental damage function (1.2.7), respectively, we get
max
ti,qi
[ui[fi(ki)− kifik(ki) + rki, tiki, ei(αiqi +
∑
j 6=i
βijqj); X˜i]] (1.2.9)
The equilibrium allocation of capital and the equilibrium net rate of return r are
determined through a system of capital mobility constraints (equation 1.2.6 for jurisdiction
i and similar equations for other jurisdictions) and capital market clearing condition
(1.2.3). The equilibrium capital in jurisdiction i and net rate of return r are thus functions
of the vector of capital tax rates t ≡ (t1, ...., tn) and the vector of environmental policies
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q ≡ (q1, ...., qn). The private goods consumption ci and public goods consumption gi, which
are functions of capital and net rate of return, are thus also functions of t and q. We can
simplify the objective function as follows:
max
ti,qi
[ui[Vi(t,q), ei(αiqi +
∑
j 6=i
βijqj); X˜i]] (1.2.10)
where V (t,q) is a vector of private goods and public goods consumption. The two first
order conditions that describe the solution to this local optimization problem are:
∂ui
∂ti
= uiV
∂Vi
∂ti
= 0 (1.2.11)
∂ui
∂qi
= uiV
∂Vi
∂qi
+ uiee
′
iαi = 0 (1.2.12)
where uiV and uie are first derivatives of utility ui with respect to goods consumption
function Vi and environmental damage ei, respectively. e
′
i is the first derivative of
environmental damage over pollution depositions, e′i =
∂ei
∂(αiqi+
∑
j 6=i
βijqj)
. The above first order
conditions imply that government jointly sets tax rates and environmental policy to
maximize local social welfare. Considering that the focus of this paper is on environmental
policy, the determination of tax rates will not be discussed here. To control for the
interplay of tax rate and environmental policy, in the econometric equation, the corporate
tax rate is included as one of the control variables.
The first order condition (1.2.12) generates the environmental policy reaction function
of jurisdiction i. Treating the environmental policies of other jurisdictions, i.e. qj, as
exogenous, the environmental policy in jurisdiction i, qi, strategically reacts to qj. The
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reaction function can be generated through differentiation of first order condition (1.2.12)6.
dqi
dqj
= −
uiV
∂2Vi
∂qj∂qi
+ ∂uiV
∂qj
∂Vi
∂qi
) + (uiee
′′
i βijαi +
∂uie
∂ei
e
′
iβije
′
iαi)
∂(uiV
∂Vi
∂qi
+ uiee′iαi)/∂qi
= (−
uiV
∂2Vi
∂qj∂qi
+ ∂uiV
∂qj
∂Vi
∂qi
∂(uiV
∂Vi
∂qi
+ uiee′iαi)/∂qi
) + (−uiee
′′
i βijαi +
∂uie
∂ei
e
′
iβije
′
iαi
∂(uiV
∂Vi
∂qi
+ uiee′iαi)/∂qi
)
= A+B
(1.2.13)
where e′′i is the second derivative of environmental damage ei over pollution depositions
(αiqi +
∑
j 6=i
βijqj).
As we can see from equation (1.2.13), there are two parts in the strategic reaction,
denoted as A and B. A and B reflect the two reasons why qi responds to qj
7:
• In A, the response is due to qj having an effect on the private and public goods
consumption in jurisdiction i, Vi(·). qj’s impact on Vi(·) is caused through qj’s impact
on the amount of capital in jurisdiction i. So the mechanism behind the strategic
reaction, part A, is the effect of others’ environmental policies on capital, which is
Mechanism 1: interjurisdictional competition. The sign of part A is ambiguous since
the sign of ∂uiV
∂qj
is ambiguous.
• Part B indicates the policy reaction that is caused by qj’s impact on environmental
damage in locality i, ei. Due to transboundary pollution spillovers, other
jurisdictions’ emissions can spill into locality i and affect local environmental damage.
The degree of pollution spillovers is parameter βij. If there is no transboundary
spillovers, which means βij = 0, then the strategic interaction of part B is also zero.
Thus the mechanism behind part B is transboundary pollution spillovers, denoted as
6Assume implicit function G(q) = G(qi, ...., qj , ...., qn) = uiV
∂Vi
∂qi
+ uiee
′
iαi = 0, the implicit partial
differentiation describes that dqidqj = −
∂G(qi,qj)/∂qj
∂G(qi,qj)/∂qi
. Calculation on ∂G(qi, qj)/∂qj and ∂G(qi, qj)/∂qi achieves
equation (1.2.13).
7 Note that the yardstick competition is not considered in this model. However this model can be easily
generalized to incorporate the yardstick competition by generalize the utility function as: ui(ci, gi, ei; q−i; X˜i),
where q−i is a vector of other jurisdictions’ environmental policies. In this case, others’ policies have direct
impact on i’s utility, and the strategic interaction have an additional component to reflect this impact.
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Mechanism 2. The sign of part B is also ambiguous. uiee
′′
i βijαi is negative since
uie < 0, e
′′
i , βij, αi > 0. While
∂uie
∂ei
e
′
iβije
′
iαi is positive.
Thus, the slope of the reaction function may take either sign and needs to be
estimated in the empirical part. There are various factors that have an impact on the
magnitude of the reaction function (1.2.13). For example, in part A, ∂Vi
∂qj
indicates the effect
of jurisdiction j’s environmental policy on jurisdiction i’s goods consumption. The larger
this effect is, the larger the magnitude of the strategic reaction will be. In part B, βij is the
fraction of pollution emissions that originated from jurisdiction j and transported to
jurisdiction i. The higher the degree of the spillovers, the larger policy response will be.
Equation (1.2.13) shows the environmental policy strategic response of jurisdiction i to
jurisdiction j’s policy. Similar equations can be applied to the response functions of
jurisdiction i to other jurisdictions, such as k. Estimating the reaction function (1.2.13) is
currently impossible due to the lack of data. The empirical work in the literature usually
estimates the reaction function dqi
d
∑
j 6=i
wijqj
, which is the reaction of jurisdiction i’s
environmental policy to the weighted average of many other jurisdictions’ policies; wij
denotes the weight assigned to locality j by i. dqi
d
∑
j 6=i
wijqj
is a function of equation (1.2.13)
and a vector of weights, w, illustrated as follows:
dqi
d
∑
j 6=i
wijqj
= R(
dqi
dq1
, ....,
dqi
dqi−1
,
dqi
dqi+1
, ....,
dqi
dqn
,w) (1.2.14)
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
This section describes the estimation specifications and data used for estimating
government environmental policy strategic interaction. The econometric equations are
based on the discussion in Section 2.2, which includes estimation on strategic interaction
and ways to differentiate different mechanisms behind strategic interaction.
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1.3.1 Estimating Strategic Interaction
To examine the effect of other countries’ environmental policies on one country’s
environmental policy, I use the following econometric equation which is based on the
equation (1.2.14) in Section 2.2:
qit = δ1
∑
j 6=i
wijtqjt + θXit−2 + αi + ηt + Trendi + εit (1.3.1)
The dependent variable, qit, is a measure of environmental policy in country i at time
t.
∑
j 6=i
wijtqjt represents other countries’ environmental policies at time t, known as the
“spatial lag” in the literature. It is the weighted average of other countries’ environmental
policies, within which wijt is a non-negative weight used to average other countries’ policies
and is assigned to country j by country i at time t. To easily make a distinction between
dependent variable and the spatial lag in the following discussion, I use “home country’s
environmental policy” to refer to the dependent variable and use “other countries’
environmental policies” to represent the spatial lag. Xit−2 is a vector of time lagged control
variables including statutory corporate tax rate. εit represents idiosyncratic shocks that are
uncorrelated across states and over time. Country fixed effects, αi, time fixed effects, ηt,
and country-specific trend, Trendi, are also included to absorb country permanent
characteristics, time-specific common shocks, and linear trends specific to each country.
The above econometric equation is also known as the “spatial autoregressive model”.
Control variables (Xit−2) are lagged considering that it takes time for environmental
policy to react to changes in one country’s social and economic conditions8. The lagged
control variables could also mitigate potential endogeneity problem that is caused by the
impact of environmental policy on social and economic conditions. In the main estimation,
control variables are lagged by two years. In the robustness checks, one-year and three-year
lagged control variables are used. In choosing the vector of control variables, I control for
8Other studies which use lagged control variables include Davies and Vadlamannati (2013), Olney (2013).
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socioeconomic conditions in a country which has potential to impact residents’ policy
preferences and policy choice. I thus include the log of per capita GDP (expenditure-side
real GDP at chained PPPs in constant 2011 US dollars). A country’s exposure to world
markets could also affect the environmental policy especially when there is international
competition on investment. I include a measure of the economy openness, the sum of
exports plus imports relative to GDP, to control for it. The statutory corporate tax rate is
included to control for government’s interplay of setting tax rate and environmental policy
discussed in Section 3. I also control for some demographic variables, including the degree
of urbanization, population (in log form), the percent of population that is older than 65,
the percent of population that is younger than 14. Considering that young and elderly
people may be more vulnerable to pollution, the populations structure could also be a
factor that affects one country’s environmental policy. Following Boockmann and Dreher
(2003) and others, I also control for political conditions which have directly impact on the
policymaking. Four political variables are included. The first is democracy, which is the
average score of Freedom House’s indexes on civil right and political liberty and ranges
from 1 (severely limited liberties) to 7 (full liberties)9. The second and third variables are
government fractionalization, and checks and balances, which are variables from Database
of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). Government fractionalization is the probability
that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will belong to
different parties. The more parties in the government there are, the more fractionalized the
government is, thus the larger this index is. Checks and balances measures the number of
decision-makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed. This variable
counts the number of veto players, which is an individual or collective actor who has to
agree in order for the legislative status quo to change, adjusting for whether these veto
players are independent of each other. The last one is the Political Constraint Index from
Henisz (2000), which estimates the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one
9https://freedomhouse.org/
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actor may lead to a change in government policy. Table 1.9 in Appendix summarizes
variables and data sources.
I employ the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) continuously updated (CUE)
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator (Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, 1996). The estimator
includes fixed effects and calculates errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity
and arbitrary autocorrelation. Besides, research suggests that the finite sample
performance of CUE may be superior than two-step GMM. In particular, there is evidence
suggesting that CUE perform better than IV/GMM in the presence of weak instrument
(Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner, 2004). There are several other issues in the estimation
need to be properly addressed, including endogeneity problem, choosing proper weights,
and the issue of time fixed effects. The discussion on these issues is as follows.
This paper uses Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) as the measure of
environmental policy (Botta and Kozluk, 2014). The EPS index contains information on
fifteen different environmental policy instruments implemented in OECD countries, which
include both non-market-based and market-based instruments. non-market-based policies
include limits to pollutants (SOx, NOx, particulate matters and Sulfur Content of Diesel)
and government energy-related R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Market-based
policies contain feed-in-tariffs (solar and wind)10, taxes (on CO2, SOx, NOx, and diesel),
price on CO2 trading schemes, renewable energy certificates trading scheme, energy
certificate emission trading scheme and the presence of deposit and refund schemes.
Endogeneity Problem
There are several issues regarding the estimation. The first issue is the endogeneity
problem associated with the “spatial lag” (other countries’ environmental policies).
Countries choose their environmental policies simultaneously and take the expectations on
10Feed-in tariffs (FITs) are a policy mechanism used to encourage deployment of renewable electricity
technologies. A FIT program typically guarantees that customers who own a FIT-eligible renewable electric-
ity generation facility, such as a roof-top solar photovoltaic system, will receive a set price from their utility
for all of the electricity they generate and provide to the grid.
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other countries’ policies into their own policy-making consideration. This implies that the
environmental policy of jurisdiction i (dependent variable qit) also has an impact on other
jurisdictions’ environmental policies (the spatial lag
∑
j 6=i
wijtqjt). Due to this reverse
causation issue, the spatial lag is endogenous. I use instrumental variables (IV) for the
spatial lag to address it. The instruments are the weighted average of other countries’
political characteristics,
∑
j 6=i
wijtZjt. The weighting scheme used to construct instruments,
wijt, is the same as for devising the spatial lag. The political variables that are used to
construct instruments include: democracy, checks and balances, and governmental
fractionalization.
Two conditions are needed to be satisfied for the instruments to be valid. First, the
instruments are exogenous, which means they are not correlated with disturbance εit.
Specifically, the home country’s environmental policy (dependent variable qit) is not
directly affected by other countries’ political environments (the instruments). After
controlling for country fixed effects, time fixed effects and various covariates of the home
country in the econometric equation, I consider our instruments more likely to be
exogenous as other countries’ political environments have limited direct impact on the
home country’s environmental policy. In practice, I conduct overidentification tests, and
the Hansen’s J statistics can not reject the exogeneity of instrument sets in most
specifications. One possible concern is the selection issue, namely, firms and individuals
may sort themselves based on other jurisdictions’ environmental policies. This concern is
also the reason why I do not use socioeconomic and demographic variables as instruments.
Due to the selection issue, these socioeconomic variables, also instruments, become
functions of the dependent variable, i.e., environmental policies, which makes the
instruments endogenous. The sorting issue is of less concern regarding political variables as
the cross-country mobility of officials is much more constrained than firms and individuals.
The second condition is that the instruments are correlated with the spatial lag. This
means that one country’s political characteristics are correlated with its environmental
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policies. This correlation is relatively intuitive. For example, the degree of democracy in
one country has an impact on its policies. Leaders in a democratic country are more
dependent on election results for their careers and thus are more likely to deliver popular
policies to cater for voters. However, this phenomenon is less likely to happen in a more
centralized country. This impact of democracy on policies is also found by Davis and
Vadlamannati (2013), who discover that more democratic countries have significantly
better labor rights. Other political variables, government fractionalization and checks and
balances have a direct impact on a country’s policymaking process, which are thus
correlated with environmental policies. Empirically, I present the results of weak
instrument tests that reject the hypothesis that the instruments are weak.
In the literature, instrumental variables (IV) method is commonly used to address this
endogeneity issue as in this paper11. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Davies and
Naughton (2014), and others use this method. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) choose Zjt
to be neighboring states’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics including
population, population density, and the degree of urbanization. One concern in using
socioeconomic and demographic variables is that these variables may not be exogenous and
random over subnational governments. This issue can be partly solved by using political
variables to construct instruments since government officials can hardly sort themselves
across countries12. Olney (2013) uses the strength and political ideology of the ruling party
and unionization density as instruments to examine strategic interaction of employment
protection policies. Like Olney (2013), I use political variables to construct instruments.
11Another method is the maximum likelihood methods (Anselin, 1988). Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993),
Murdoch, Rahmatian, and Thayer (1993), Besley and Case (1995), Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent (1997)
and others use this method. Anselin (1988) provides detailed discussion on this method.
12Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) solve this issue by employing a policy intervention in Sweden as IV to
estimate the strategic interaction on the welfare benefit levels.
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Weighting Schemes
Choosing the proper weighting schemes for the spatial lag is another important issue.
To estimate the system, we need to specify the weighting matrix as a priori. The weights
assigned to country j by the home country should reflect country j’s degree of importance
when the home country makes policy decisions. The degree of importance varies with the
reasons why the home country reacts to country j’s policy change. As discussed above, the
potential underlying mechanisms of government policy interaction include
interjurisdictional competition, transboundary spillovers, yardstick competition and
international coordination.
In this paper, I use four different weighting schemes to reflect different mechanisms. In
the first weight, I use GDP per capita (GDPPC) to construct it. The weight country i
assigned to country j is wijt =
GDPPCjt∑
k 6=i
GDPPCkt
. When the home country uses environmental
policy to compete for mobile resources, the more competitive the two countries are in
attracting capital, the more weight that should be assigned. Countries with higher GDP
per capita may have a larger influence on the capital movement considering that Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) may be attracted to higher-skilled and/or wealthier markets.
The second weighting scheme is constructed by using the variable, openness.
wijt =
Opennessjt∑
k 6=i
Opennesskt
. Openness is the sum of exports plus imports relative to GDP, which is
a common proxy for the inverse of trade costs in the empirical FDI literature. Openness
has an impact on the movement of capital. As discussed by Blonigen (2005), horizontal
FDI takes place to avoid trade costs.
I also use similarity of income per capita to capture the similarity among countries and
construct weights (following Case, Rosen and Hines, 1993). Similarity of income per capita
is measured as the inverse of income per capita difference 1/(|incjt − incit|), where incjt is
the income per capita of country j. The weights are constructed as wijt =
1/(|incjt−incit|)∑
k 6=i
1/(|inckt−incit|) .
This weights take the mechanism of yardstick competition into consideration. When the
home country makes environmental policy mainly due to voters’ pressure caused by
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yardstick competition, countries that have more similar conditions would have larger
impact on voter’s preferences, and thus should be assigned with higher weights.
Besides the above weighting schemes, I also use the simple average weighting scheme
wijt =
1
n−1 , where n− 1 is the number of countries besides the home country. In sum, this
paper uses four alternative weighting schemes to construct the spatial lag, which are GDP
per capita, openness, similarity of income per capita, and simple average. These weighting
schemes intend to capture other countries’ degree of importance when the home country
makes environmental policies in terms of different aspects. While since we are unable to
measure the degree of importance precisely and comprehensively, I construct different
weighting schemes. And the results of using different weighting schemes can serve as a
comparison and robustness checks to each other.
Time Fixed Effects
Another issue is the time fixed effects. It is not feasible to include every year dummies
to absorb the year-specific shocks that are common to all countries. This is because of the
construction of spatial lag. Take the uniform weights case as an example; the spatial lag is
other countries’ simple average of environmental policies
∑
j 6=i
wijtEjt =
∑
j 6=i
Ejt
n−1 , which can be
rewritten as
∑
j 6=i
Ejt
n−1 =
∑
j
Ejt−Eit
n−1 =
∑
j
Ejt
n−1 − Eitn−1 . In a certain year,
∑
j
Ejt
n−1 is fixed across
countries; if we include every year dummies in the regression to average out the common
part across countries,
∑
j
Ejt
n−1 would be averaged out, and only − Eitn−1 is used for estimating
the coefficient of spatial lag. And the coefficient of spatial lag on the home country’s
environmental policy Eit is thus − 1(n−1) by construction. It is not a proper estimate of the
strategic interaction. This issue has also been recognized by Devereux et al. (2008), Davies
and Vadlamannatid (2013) and others. To control for the time fixed effects without
bringing about the above issue, this paper includes both a country-specific time trend and
a set of three-year period dummies in the regression.
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1.3.2 Disentangling Different Mechanisms
Besides estimating an overall degree of strategic interaction across countries, I also
differentiate the distinct underlying reasons of strategic interaction. The specifications that
differentiate the coordination among EU countries, interjurisdictional competition, and
transboundary pollution spillovers are presented.
To Differentiate the Coordination
To disentangle the strategic interaction that is brought about by the coordination
among countries, particularly among EU countries, I explore the different interaction
patterns between EU and non-EU countries. There are noticeable differences between
countries holding EU membership and countries that do not. Countries in the EU enjoy a
single market with almost free movement of capital, goods, services, and people. This
mobility is further enhanced with the establishment of the Euro area (Eurozone) in 1999.
Moreover, there have been substantial efforts on environmental policy coordination across
countries in EU, especially since the adoption of the First Environmental Action
Programme in 1973.
I use the following econometric equation to estimate the different strategic interaction
patterns:
qit = δ
1
1(EUit)q
EU
−it + δ
2
1(EUit)q
NEU
−it + δ
3
1(1− EUit)qEU−it + δ41(1− EUit)qNEU−it
+ θXit−2 + αi + ηt + Trendi + εit
(1.3.2)
This specification is similar to the specification (1.3.1) which estimates the strategic
interaction. The covariates included in Xit−2, the country fixed effects, time fixed effects
and country-specific trend are the same with specification (1.3.1). The difference between
these two specifications lies in the spatial lags.
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I separate the countries other than the home country i by EU membership and
calculate two spatial lags within each group, one for EU countries and one for non-EU
countries. The variable EUit is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if country i holds the EU
membership at year t. qEU−it is a spatial lag that is constructed within countries holding EU
membership. qNEU−it is the spatial lag for countries without EU membership. Then the two
spatial lags are interacted with whether the home country is an EU member state, which
gives us four variables. The instruments are also recalculated this way. Table 1.10 in the
Appendix lists the names of EU countries and non-EU countries.
This specification allows home country to respond differently to other countries
depending on whether other countries hold EU membership. The coefficient δ11 is the effect
of policies of other EU countries on the policy of a EU country. The coefficient δ41 reflects
the effect of policies of other non-EU countries on the policy of a non-EU country. We
expect to see larger effect among EU countries.
To Differentiate Interjurisdictional Competition
To differentiate the strategic interaction brought by interjurisdictional competition,
the strength of capital control is used. Theoretically speaking, interjurisdictional
competition requires free mobility of capital among jurisdictions, which leads to equal net
return to capital across jurisdictions. It means that if there is no control on capital
movement, then the equation (1.2.6) fik − ti = r ∀i is satisfied for all jurisdictions. While
if some jurisdictions have tight capital control that restrains capital mobility, say
jurisdiction jc, equation (1.2.6) does not have to hold. And the net return to capital does
not necessarily equal the net return to capital in other jurisdictions, fjck − tjc T r. In the
case of an extreme capital control, the amount of capital in jurisdiction jc is fixed given its
own tax rate tjc and environmental policy qjc . A fixed amount of capital implies that the
private and public goods consumptions Vjc are also fixed. Thus, part A in equation (1.2.13)
is zero and the strategic interaction is not caused by interjurisdictional competition.
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I use the following econometric equation to differentiate the strategic interaction that
is brought about by interjurisdictional competition.
qit = δ
1
1(ccit)q
C
−it + δ
2
1(ccit)q
N
−it + δ
3
1(1− ccit)qC−it + δ41(1− ccit)qN−it + θXit−2 + αi + ηt + Trendi + εit
(1.3.3)
Following Devereux et al. (2008), and similar to the specification (1.3.2), four spatial
lags are constructed based on whether other countries and the home country have tight
capital control in this equation . ccit indicates whether country i has tight capital control
in year t; it is equal to 1 if there is tight capital control and equal to 0 otherwise. Based on
whether one country has tight capital control, I separate countries besides the home
country into two groups and construct spatial lags within each group, respectively. Within
countries that have tight capital control, qC−it =
∑
j 6=i
wijtccjqjt is constructed; within countries
that do not have tight capital control, qN−it =
∑
j 6=i
wijt(1− ccj)qjt is constructed. The two
spatial lags are then interacted with ccit, whether home country has tight capital control,
which generates four variables in the econometric equation. The coefficient δ41 is the effect
of policies of other countries where capital is freely mobile on the policy of a home country
which also does not have capital controls. Other coefficients can be interpreted similarly.
The difference in the four coefficients, δ11, δ
2
1, δ
3
1, δ
4
1, manifest the strategic interaction
caused by interjurisdictional competition and other mechanisms. The reason is that when a
country has tight capital control, the capital mobility in this country is restrained; so, its
incentive to compete for capital through strategically adjusting environmental policy is
relatively weakened. The weaker incentive on interjurisdictional competition would be
reflected in the difference in the values of the coefficients, especially between δ11 and δ
4
1. δ
4
1
reflects the strategic interaction between the home country and other countries when
neither has capital control, in which the interjurisdictional competition is relatively
stronger. While δ11 reflects the strategic interaction between the home country and other
countries that both sides have capital control, and the interjurisdictional competition plays
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a limited role in policymaking. It thus reflects the interaction mainly caused by other
mechanisms. The difference between the two coefficients reflect the strategic interaction
that is brought about by interjurisdictional competition. If we do not find significant
difference between them, we could claim that the interaction is not mainly due to
interjurisdictional competition.
This paper uses the Chinn-Ito index, 2014 version, (Chinn and Ito, 2006) to measure
capital control. The Chinn-Ito index is an index measuring a country’s degree of capital
account openness and is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The indexes on the “most
financially open” countries and “least financially open” countries are 2.39 and -1.89
respectively. To distinguish between countries which are principally open to capital flows
and which are not, I divided the observations based on the value of the index. For
countries in time t that has a value of the index above 1, they are regarded as “has no tight
capital control” and ccit = 0. Otherwise, the country is regarded as “has tight capital
control” and ccit = 1. Besides using 1 as the number to divide whether there is tight
capital control, I also use alternative number, 0, to check the robustness.
To Differentiate Transboundary Pollution Spillovers
The strategic interaction can also be caused by transboundary pollution spillovers;
other jurisdictions environmental policies determine the amount of local pollution
emissions which can transport to the home country and affect its environmental quality. To
differentiate the strategic interaction brought by transboundary spillovers, I control for the
pollution depositions from other countries. I use the following specification to estimate.
qOSPit = δ
OSP
1
∑
j 6=i
wijtq
OSP
jt + δ2D−it + δ3(1− αit) + θXit−2 + αi + ηt + Trendi + εit (1.3.4)
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Similarly, the covariates in the Xit−2, the country fixed effect, time fixed effect and
country-specific trend in the above specification are the same as for specification (1.3.1).
Besides the similarities, there are two differences. The first is this equation explores the
strategic interaction specifically on countries’ oxidized sulphur policies instead of general
environmental policies as in specification (1.3.1). Considering that the degree of
transboundary spillovers varies greatly across different types of pollutants, I choose one
type of pollutant, oxidized sulphur, as the example to study the transboundary pollution
spillovers. Thus, the environmental policies used in the equation are chosen to be most
related to oxidized sulphur. I employ an Oxidized Sulphur Policy index (OSP) instead of
EPS to construct the dependent variable and the spatial lag. OSP is an index that is
created by the author by employing the same information on SOx taxes and SOx emission
limit when constructing EPS. The second distinction from specification (1.3.1) is that this
specification adds two transboundary spillover variables, which are called “spill-in” and
“spill-out”. Spill-in, denoted as D−it in the equation, reflects that neighbors’ pollution
flowed into the home country, and this paper uses oxidized sulphur pollution depositions
which are from all other countries to measure it. Spill-out reflects that one own
jurisdiction’s pollution spills out to neighboring jurisdictions, which is quantified as the
fraction of total sulfur emissions that are deposited on other countries (1− αit). The level
of emissions is not used due to its high correlation with the dependent variable,
environmental policies.
Regarding strategic interaction, when we control for the spill-ins, D−it, in the
regression, δOSP1 does not reflect the impact caused by transboundary pollution spillovers.
This is because that when the pollution depositions from other countries, D−it, are
controlled for, the environmental quality in the home country is not influenced by other
countries’ environmental policies through transboundary pollution spillovers. Thus, under
this specification, the home country would not strategically react to other countries’
environmental policies due to the transboundary spillovers. The strategic interaction that
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is caused by the transboundary spillovers can be reflected by the difference between
coefficients of the spatial lag in the case of controlling or not controlling for the spill-ins.
Regarding the coefficients on the two spillover variables, δ2 directly measures the
impact of spill-ins on environmental policy stringency. A positive coefficient indicates that
when there are more pollution spilled over from other countries, government may increase
standard to mitigate the damage of more pollution. δ3 reflects how government responds to
the spill-outs, and a negative coefficient shows that governments relax environmental
standard when they can spill a higher fraction of pollution to other countries. In this case,
a negative δ3 reveals free-riding behavior.
The spillover variables are constructed using transport matrix from European
Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) (Eliassen and Saltbones, 1983;
EMEP/MSC-W calculated SR country tables and data13). This matrix measures the
amount of sulfur emitted by country j (column entries) that falls on country i (row entry).
The sulfur depositions imported from other countries and the fraction of one country’s
emission deposited on its own are constructed, respectively. I use only European countries
in this estimation since other countries are sparsely located on different continents, and the
cross-continent spillovers are quite limited. Some countries, like Australia, barely have
spillovers with other countries.
1.3.3 Summary Statistics
The data used in the estimation covers 26 OECD countries from 1990 to 2012. In the
specification (1.3.1) and (1.3.3), OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) is
used to measure each country’s environmental policy stringency. In the specification
(1.3.4), Oxidized Sulphur Policy (OSP) index is used to measure environmental policy on
oxidized sulphur. OSP is created by the author by employing the same data on the SOx
13See http://emep.int/mscw/ for details
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taxes and SOx emission limit when constructing EPS. Table 1.9 in Appendix shows
variables and data sources.
Figure 2.1 shows the trend of Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) over time.
Overall, from 1990 to 2012, the average environmental policy became more and more
stringent. On average, EU countries have higher policy stringency than non-EU countries.
For EU countries, there are two times that EPS falls, 2007 and 2012. These are mainly due
to the swings in the carbon price of EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The trend of
increasingly stringent environmental policies across OECD countries is not consistent with
the prediction of the “race to the bottom.”
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.4 plot the OECD countries’ EPS for 1995 and 2010 on a world
map, respectively. The categories are the same across maps. We can see that every country
has increased the environmental policy stringency since 1995. The country with strictest
environmental policy in 2010 is Netherland. Table 2.1 shows the evolution of different
categories EPS. And the Oxidized Sulphur Policy which is used in the specification (1.3.4)
is calculated as the average of index of SOx taxes and SOx emission limit. We can see a
tightening of EPS in almost all categories over time. Table 2.2 reports the summary
statistics for variables used in the estimation.
1.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results from the main specifications. The results
from estimating strategic interaction are presented first. Then results of differentiating
underlying reasons follow.
Figure 2.6 shows a series of bin scatter-plots of the home country’s environmental
policy against the spatial lag across continents. The spatial lag is other countries’
environmental policies, which is constructed using similarity of income per capita as the
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weighting scheme. We observe a positive relationship between the home country’s
environmental policy and the spatial lag in all the continents studied in this paper.
1.4.1 Results on Estimating the Strategic Interaction
The regression results of estimating strategic interaction across countries, specification
(1.3.1), are shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.7. One country’s environmental policy
stringency (EPS) is the dependent variable. Spatial lag, other countries’ environmental
stringency, is the key explanatory variable of interest. Control variables are two-year
lagged.
Table 2.3 shows the results of using similarity of income per capital as the weighting
matrix. All regressions contain spatial lag and country fixed effects. From column (1) to
(4), control variables, country-specific trend and time fixed effects are added
correspondingly. In all the columns, we can see that there is a positive and statistically
significant effect of other countries’ environmental policy stringency on one country’s
environmental policy. And the coefficients are larger than one. Our preferred specification
is that of column (4), which controls for covariates and absorbs country permanent
characteristics, time-varying year-specific common shocks as well as a linear trend that are
specific to each country. The coefficient of the spatial lag is 1.25, which is significant at the
1 percent level. A rough interpretation of it is that if the average of other countries’
environmental policy stringency increase by 1 point, the home country would increase its
environmental policy stringency by 1.25 point. Other variables also have an impact on the
stringency of environmental policy. Countries that hold membership of European Union
have higher GDP per capita, are more democratic and have higher corporate tax rate tend
to have more stringent environmental policies. The degree of urbanization tends to lower
the policy stringency. With respect to the instruments, results of the various test are also
reported. I test for underidentification using Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (Kleibergen
and Paap, 2006). The probability value indicates that we can reject the null-hypothesis of
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underidentification at the 1% level. I also test for the validity of instruments
(overidentification test) using Hansen’s J-test (Hansen, 1982), and we are unable to reject
the null-hypothesis of exogeneity at the conventional level of significance indicating the
validity of instruments. Weak instrument issue is tested using Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F
statistic, which shows that we can reject that the instruments are weak.
Table 2.7 shows the results of repeating the specification in column (4) of Table 2.3
using other three weights, including simple average, GDP per capita and openness. Control
variables, country-specific trend and time fixed effects are all included. Compared with
Table 2.3, we still find positive strategic interaction on setting environmental policies. The
scales of the coefficients are smaller, and the statistical significance of the coefficients are
lower compared with the results of using similarity of income per capita as the weighting
scheme. The test statistics also show that the estimation models are not underidentified
and instruments are exogenous and not weak.
Although the positive strategic interaction across countries is consistent with the
prediction of interjurisdictional competition on capital, it’s possible that other underlying
reasons drive the policy interdependence. The positive coefficient could reflect the policy
imitation across countries due to yardstick competition, in which case voters use other
countries’ environmental policies as yardstick to evaluate the home country officials’
performances. It could also be possible that countries increase the stringency to positively
reciprocate the lower transboundary pollution spillovers due to other countries’ more
stringent policies. The positive coefficient could also be capturing the international
coordination of combating environmental issues. The various international treaties and
agreements reflect the coordination efforts. Further analysis is needed to differentiate the
underlying mechanism of the strategic interaction, to which we turn.
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1.4.2 Results of Differentiating the Coordination
From 2.3 and Table 2.7, we find positive strategic interaction across countries. We do
not know what mechanism and reasons that this relationship can be attributed to. I
estimate the specification (1.3.2) to disentangle the international coordination efforts.
Results are shown in table 1.7. Note that in column (4), there is potential weak
identification (low Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) and underidentification issue (high
underidentification test p Value) when using similarity of income per capita as weighting
schemes. Thus the results from the column (1) to (3) are preferred. The coefficients on the
first variable, which indicate the reaction of an EU country to other EU countries’ policy
changes, are positive and statistically significant at 1% level in most specifications. This
results indicate that there are strong strategic interactions across EU countries. The
coefficients on the third variable, which indicate the response of a non-EU country to other
EU countries’ policy changes, are also positive and statistically significant at the
conventional level. It means that when EU countries increase the environmental standard,
other countries also increase their environmental standards. While this positive reaction is
not found when the spatial lag is non-EU countries, as shown in the coefficients of the
second and fourth variable in the column (1) to (3). I also check the difference across
coefficients and find that there is statistically significant difference between the coefficients
of the first variable and second variable in most specifications. This means that when the
home country is an EU member, it reacts significantly more to other EU countries than to
other non-EU countries. Differences across other variables are not found.
I also consider the effect of euro area on the strategic interaction. Results are
presented in Table 1.8. The variable “Eurozone” is a dummy and equals to one if this
country is in euro area that year. In our dataset, most EU countries, twelve out of eighteen,
adopt the euro as their common currency, mostly in 1999. The coefficients of the first
variable, Eurozone * Home country in EU * Spatial lag of EU, are positive and statistically
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significant in most specifications. This results indicates that the strategic interaction on
environmental policymaking is stronger after adopting the euro as their common currency.
In summary, there is a positive impact of environmental policies in EU countries on
other countries. The strategic interaction across EU countries is positive and statistically
stronger than the interaction across other countries. This interaction is enhanced with the
adoption of the euro as a common currency among EU countries.
1.4.3 Results of Differentiating the Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion
I estimate the specification (1.3.3) to differentiate interjurisdictional competition,
results are reported in Table 2.8. As in Table 2.7, control variables, country-specific trend
and time fixed effects are all included in this set of estimates. The four variables displayed
in the table are the interaction of two set of variables; one is whether the home country has
tight capital control; the other is whether other countries have tight capital control. For
example, the coefficient of the first variable, Home country with capital control * Spatial
lag with capital control, captures whether the environmental policy in the home country
that have capital control strategically react to policies in other countries that also have
capital control. The coefficient of the fourth variable, Home country without capital
control * Spatial lag without capital control, captures the effect of policies in other
countries where capital is freely mobile on policies in the home country where capital is
freely mobile too. The coefficient of the fourth variable is expected to be larger if
interjurisdictional competition mainly drives the interaction.
From the results, we can see that the coefficients of the first variable, Home country
with capital control * Spatial lag with capital control, are statistically significant at
conventional level in all the specifications, which indicates that the other reasons besides
interjurisdictional competition contribute to the strategic interaction. When both countries
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in spatial lag and the home country have no tight capital control (the fourth variable), we
expect that the interjurisdictional competition has a larger effect on the strategic
interaction. If interjurisdictional competition plays an important role in the strategic
interaction, we expect that this impact would be reflected in the difference between the
coefficient of the fourth variable and other variables. I test the difference between the
coefficient of the first variable and the coefficient of the fourth variable and find that we are
unable to reject that these two coefficients are the same for column (1) to (3). The p values
are 0.683, 0.202 and 0.843 respectively for the similarity tests of column (1) to (3). In
column (4), the coefficient of the fourth variable is negative and statistically insignificant,
and the strategic interaction across countries with capital control is stronger than that of
countries without capital control.
In sum, I find a lack of difference between the coefficient of the first and fourth
variable, which shows that the strategic interactions on environmental policy are similar
across countries with or without capital control. This finding indicates that the interaction
on environmental policies are not mainly driven by capital movement across countries. The
implication is that interjurisdictional competition plays a quite limited role in the strategic
interaction on environmental policies.
1.4.4 Results of Differentiating the Transboundary Spillovers
The regression results of differentiating the transboundary spillovers is shown in table
2.9, which is estimated based on specification (1.3.4). Considering the degree of
transboundary spillovers varies greatly across pollutants, I use oxidized sulphur as an
example to explore the effect of transboundary spillovers on policy stringency. The
dependent variable is Oxidized Sulphur Policy (OSP) in one country, which mainly
includes taxes and emission limit on SOx. The spatial lag is other countries’ Oxidized
Sulphur Policies. Two types of transboundary spillovers are included, “spill-out” which is
33
the fraction of emissions deposited on other countries, and “spill-ins” which is the pollution
depositions transported from other countries14.
Regarding two spillover variables, spill-ins have statistically significant and positive
impact on OSP. The results mean that when pollution depositions from other countries
increase, the home country tends to increase its environmental policy, presumably to
mitigate the harmful effect of pollution. On the other hand, when pollution depositions
decrease, the home country tend to relax environmental policy stringency. The coefficient
is 0.429 when using similarity of income per capita for the weighting matrix. A rough
interpretation is that if oxidized sulphur pollution transported from other countries
increases by 10%, the home country will increase the stringency of OSP by 0.0429 point.
Considering that the mean of the stringency of OSP is 1.69, the scale of the impact is
relatively small. When controlling for the spill-ins, the coefficients on the spatial lag of
OSP are still positive and statistically significant in most specifications, which means the
strategic interaction still exists. These results indicate that other mechanisms besides
transboundary spillovers also play a role in generating countries’ interaction. I repeat this
regression but without controlling for the spill-ins; results are shown in Appendix Table
1.17. The coefficients of spatial lag are quite similar with or without controlling for
spill-ins. Considering that the strategic interaction of controlling for spill-ins does not
include the interaction caused by transboundary spillovers, similar coefficients mean that
the transboundary spillovers play a limited role in the strategic interaction.
Spill-outs, fraction of emissions deposited on other countries, have a positive effect on
environmental stringency; none of the coefficients of spill-outs are negative. The results
show that when the home country exports a larger fraction of emissions on other countries,
it tends to increase policy stringency rather than loosening policy in order to free ride.
These results indicate limited free-riding behaviors on setting oxidized sulphur policies
14The sample used for the specifications includes only 21 European countries. Other countries that are
sparsely located in different continents have very limited pollution spillovers between them, which are thus
not considered in the estimation. The results of using the same sample but without controlling the spill-ins,
depositions from other countries, are reported in Appendix Table 1.17
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among European countries. To the opposite, there is even a certain degree of cooperation.
This finding is consistent with results of Sigman (2002) who finds cooperative behaviors,
not free-riding, on water pollution among European countries.
To summarize, transboundary pollution spillovers have impact on countries’
environmental policies. Countries increase policy stringency to mitigate larger pollution
spill-ins, but the scale of impact is relatively small. The strategic interaction that is caused
by spillovers is also limited. Also, I find certain degree of cooperation instead of free-riding
behavior on setting environmental policy among European countries.
1.5 Robustness Checks
A battery of additional robustness checks is also carried out. The first set of estimates
replaces the two-year lagged control variables with one-year lagged and three-year lagged
control variables. Results are shown in Table 1.11 and Table 1.12, respectively. Using
one-year and three-year lagged control variables, there is still a statistically significant and
positive effect of other countries’ environmental policy stringency on the home country
policy, but only under the weighting scheme of similarity of income per capita. Under other
weighting schemes, the coefficients on spatial lag are also positive but not statistically
significant at the conventional level. Comparing with the results of using two-year lagged
control variables, the magnitude of coefficients is relatively smaller in the specifications
using one-year and three-year lagged control variables.
In the second set of estimates, I include a one-year lag of the dependent variable to
control for potential dynamic effects. As shown in Table 1.13, the lagged dependent
variable is positive and statistically significant. After controlling for the lag of the
dependent variable, the spatial lag, other countries’ environmental policies, still shows a
positive and statistically significant effect, although the coefficients are smaller.
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Third, I recalculate the measure on the environmental policy (EPS) to exclude the
potential correlation across countries in the calculation of EPS. In calculating one country’s
environmental policy stringency, one piece of information that is used is the carbon price in
the “cap and trade” carbon market. To be more specific, in 2005, EU countries introduce
emissions trading system (ETS) which links the greenhouse gas emissions in 31 European
countries into one market. Since the carbon price in ETS is the same across participating
countries, if we use the carbon price to calculate environmental policy stringency, the
calculated policy stringency is correlated across countries by construction. This correlation
may overestimate the strategic interaction on environmental policy that we intend to
measure. Besides, the carbon price may be correlated with economic outcomes and brings
a certain degree of endogeneity. So I recalculate the environmental policy stringency (EPS)
by excluding the price in carbon market and rerun the regressions using new EPS. The
results are shown in Table 1.14. There is still positive and statistically significant effect of
other countries’ environmental policy when using similarity of income per capita as the
weighting matrix. The coefficients of using other weighting schemes are not statistically
significant, but have a positive sign in first two columns, simple average and GDP per
capita as weights, and negative sign of using openness as weights.
Fourth, I use the spatial lag variable that is two years in the future to run the
regression. A county should not react to a policy change that has not been made yet, and
thus we expect the coefficient should be statistically insignificant. The results are shown in
Table 1.15. The spatial lag is not statistically significant in all specifications as expected.
Also, we can not reject that the coefficients are equal to zero in all specifications.
Fifth, I also check how sensitive the results of differentiating interjurisdictional
competition to the way of specifying countries with tight capital control. Instead of using
one as the number to divide countries with or without tight capital control, I use zero as
the number. Under this setting, when the capital control index of one country, Chinn-Ito
index, is larger than zero, then this country is specified as “has no tight capital control”.
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Otherwise, it is specified as “has tight capital control”. The results of estimating
specification (1.3.3) are presented in Table 1.16. Under this group scheme, there is no
country that is classified as “has tight capital control” since 2008. Thus, the sample size is
smaller than before. But we still can not find statistically significant difference between the
coefficients of the four variables.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper explores the question of whether OECD countries engage in strategic
environmental policymaking and disentangles distinct mechanisms behind the policy
interaction. My analysis suggests that there is a positive interaction between countries’
environmental policies. Through differentiating the potential mechanisms behind the
interaction, I find that the interaction mainly manifests the international coordination on
environmental policies, especially among EU countries. Also, EU countries’ policies are
increasingly coordinated with each others’ since the adoption of the euro as a common
currency. The interjurisdictional competition and pollution spillovers play limited roles
behind the interaction.
My finding can partly explain the trend of increasingly stringent environmental policy
since if there is limited race across countries, we do not expect to see the “race to the
bottom” on environmental policy. The reasons of limited regulatory races on
environmental policy are multilayered. On the one hand, environmental regulations are
seldom definitive for firms’ locational decisions at the international level. Studies on this
topic include Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2008), Mulatu et al. (2010) and a review paper,
Carruthers and Lamoreaux (2016). Given the limited impact of environmental regulation
on capital, countries may not choose environmental policy to compete for capital, but use
other policy instruments that have a larger influence on capital movement, such as the
corporate tax rate. On the other hand, there has been considerable international
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cooperation on combating environmental issues. The participation on international
environmental treaties is one example. Note that the lack of interjurisdictional competition
in setting environmental policies does not imply that there is no competition regarding
other government policies. Governments may use other instruments, such as corporate and
personal tax rates, to compete for the capital.
It is also important to further explore the incentives and reasons behind the
international coordination on environmental policies. Here I discuss some potential reasons.
First, some environmental problems and pollution produce externalities across countries.
The spillover effects provide an incentive on international coordination. In the empirical
results, I also find limited free-riding behaviors on setting oxidized sulphur policies among
European countries, which is consistent with the coordination behavior. Second, the
environmental standard coordination could reflect the harmonization of product standards
among trade partners. To avoid market segmentation, industries in both low-regulating
and high-regulating countries have a common interest in harmonizing product standards
(Holzinger and Sommerer, 2011). The third potential mechanism is reciprocity. Countries
may increase the environmental standards to reciprocate other countries’ efforts on
combating environmental issues.
The results in this paper have policy implications. The first implication is that
decentralized environmental policymaking does not necessarily bring about a “race to the
bottom.” And the responsibility for providing environmental quality need not rest entirely
on a central authority. Second, when a country adopts a more stringent environmental
policy, it has a positive external effect on other countries’ environmental policymaking.
This externality needs to be noticed both from the academic and the public policy
perspective. I also recommend to devise certain mechanisms to reward and compensate the
positive externality so that our environmental policies achieve more desired outcomes.
Third, further coordination and cooperation to reinforce the policymaking interaction are
suggested.
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These conclusions should be interpreted cautiously because they are based on the
analysis of developed OECD countries. In the future, expanding the dataset to include
developing countries and embedding different mechanisms in a more complete model are
logic next steps for research. Another research direction is to examine what motivates
countries’ policy coordination and cooperation.
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Figure 1.1: Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) Over Time
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Figure 1.2: OECD countries’ EPS Plotted on a World Map, 1995
Figure 1.3: OECD countries’ EPS Plotted on a World Map, 2010
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Figure 1.4: One Country’s EPS versus Spatial Lag
Notes: The weighting matrix for constructing the spatial lag is similarity of income per capita.
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Table 1.1: Evolution of EPS, Different Categories
year period 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2012 Total
EPS 0.994 1.218 1.775 2.634 2.968 1.74
EPS, Market Based Policy 0.565 0.834 1.221 1.918 2.008 1.186
EPS, Non Market Based Policy 1.423 1.605 2.332 3.352 3.929 2.297
EPS, Oxidized Sulphur Policy 0.583 0.846 2.035 2.985 3.038 1.691
EPS, SOx tax 0.385 0.715 1.4 1.485 1.404 1.005
EPS, SOx limit 0.782 0.977 2.669 4.485 4.673 2.378
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EPS 598 1.74 0.9 0.21 4.13
OSP 598 1.69 1.44 0 5.5
Democracy 598 1.32 0.62 1 5
Gov Fractionalization 598 0.3 0.27 0 0.83
Checks and Balances 598 4.22 1.26 1 11
Spill-ins: Depositions from Others 483 911.54 844.34 59.74 7067
Spill-outs: Fraction of Emissions on Others (%) 483 76.86 8.41 56.12 92
EU Membership 598 0.57 0.49 0 1
GDP Per Capita (Log) 598 10.26 0.39 8.96 11.06
Openness (%) 598 79.31 46.93 12.05 286.3
Corporate Tax Rate (%) 598 32.8 8.53 12.5 58.15
Urbanization 598 74.4 10.14 47.92 97.73
Population (Log) 598 16.8 1.15 15.07 19.57
Population > 65 (%) 598 14.47 3.24 4.54 24.29
Population < 14 (%) 598 18.38 3.58 13.13 36.25
Political Constraint Index 598 0.78 0.09 0.34 0.89
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Table 1.3: Results of Estimating Overall Effect of Strategic Interaction, Similarity of
Income per Capita as Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighing Matrix Similarity of income per capital
Spatial Lag 1.042*** 1.436*** 1.201*** 1.250***
(0.0345) (0.357) (0.219) (0.283)
EU membership -0.0111 0.272** 0.254**
(0.111) (0.107) (0.111)
GDP per capita (log) -0.146 0.476 0.617*
(0.38) (0.347) (0.35)
Openness -0.00251 -0.00303 -0.00178
(0.00413) (0.0028) (0.00242)
Corporate tax rate 0.0284*** 0.00907** 0.00989***
(0.00588) (0.00366) (0.00373)
Urbanization 0.0117 -0.137*** -0.147***
(0.0149) (0.043) (0.0393)
Population -3.534 1.333 0.682
(2.517) (1.88) (1.772)
Age structure (> 65 %) -0.164*** -0.00599 -0.0187
(0.0631) (0.0701) (0.0703)
Age structure (< 14 %) -0.106*** -0.0850** -0.0758
(0.0318) (0.043) (0.0546)
Democracy 0.152* 0.194** 0.186***
(0.0878) (0.083) (0.0719)
Political constraint 0.469 0.234 0.244
(0.339) (0.261) (0.257)
Government fractionalization 0.061 -0.0172 0.00668
(0.155) (0.12) (0.119)
Government checks and balance -0.033 -0.015 -0.0196
(0.0288) (0.0179) (0.0176)
Observations 543 543 543 543
R-squared 0.746 0.713 0.845 0.841
Country-specific Trend NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0.00402 0.00137 0.000316
Hansen’s J p Value 0.206 0.521 0.253 0.211
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 27.23 6.179 13.1 14.14
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression. Coefficients are estimates from equation (4.1). All
specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include
democracy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same
weighting scheme as the spatial lag. Except for spatial lag, other control variables are two-year lagged.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidentification test
uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Table 1.4: Results of Estimating Overall Effect of Strategic Interaction, Other Weights
(1) (2) (3)
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighing Matrix Simple Average GDP per capita Openness
Spatial Lag 0.79 1.064* 0.351
(0.542) (0.639) (0.375)
Observations 546 546 546
R-squared 0.895 0.893 0.895
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0 0
Hansen’s J p Value 0.768 0.732 0.43
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 17.22 15 17.05
Notes: All specifications include a full set of control variables, country-specific trend, year fixed effect
and country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression. Coefficients are estimates of δ1
from equation (4.1).
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag
include democracy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the
same weighting scheme as the spatial lag. Except for spatial lag, other control variables are two-year
lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidentification
test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
45
T
ab
le
1.
5:
R
es
u
lt
s
of
D
iff
er
en
ti
at
in
g
In
te
rj
u
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
al
C
om
p
et
it
io
n
,
A
ll
W
ei
gh
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
E
n
v
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
P
ol
ic
y
S
tr
in
ge
n
cy
(E
P
S
)
W
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
M
a
tr
ix
S
im
p
le
A
ve
ra
ge
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
O
p
en
n
es
s
S
im
il
ar
it
y
of
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
w
it
h
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
o
l
*
S
p
a
ti
al
la
g
w
it
h
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
0.
48
5*
*
0.
30
0*
0.
40
2*
*
2.
87
5*
**
(0
.2
11
)
(0
.1
63
)
(0
.2
00
)
(0
.5
01
)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
w
it
h
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
o
l
*
S
p
a
ti
al
la
g
w
it
h
ou
t
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
0.
37
3
0.
53
2
0.
19
3
-1
.6
19
**
*
(0
.4
23
)
(0
.3
77
)
(0
.5
19
)
(0
.4
21
)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
w
it
h
ou
t
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
o
l
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
w
it
h
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
0.
06
51
0.
01
84
0.
01
66
0.
59
9*
**
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
73
)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
w
it
h
ou
t
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
o
l
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
w
it
h
ou
t
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
0.
71
2*
0.
89
6*
*
0.
52
6
-0
.1
15
(0
.4
14
)
(0
.3
66
)
(0
.4
76
)
(0
.3
26
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
54
6
54
6
54
6
54
3
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
89
3
0.
88
8
0.
89
4
0.
83
2
C
ou
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
T
re
n
d
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
C
ou
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
T
es
t
p
V
al
u
e
0
0
0
0
H
an
se
n
’s
J
p
V
al
u
e
0.
80
3
0.
78
2
0.
47
3
0.
56
8
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
rk
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
8.
82
0
10
.9
4
6.
69
7
2.
94
4
N
o
te
s:
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
of
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s,
co
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
,
ye
ar
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
is
fr
om
a
se
p
ar
at
e
re
gr
es
si
on
.
T
h
er
e
ar
e
fo
u
r
sp
at
ia
l
la
gs
in
ea
ch
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
.
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
fo
u
r
sp
a
ti
a
l
la
g
s
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
δ1 1
,δ
2 1
,δ
3 1
,δ
4 1
fr
o
m
eq
u
at
io
n
(4
.2
).
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
on
va
ri
ab
le
”H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
w
it
h
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
w
it
h
ca
p
it
a
l
co
n
tr
o
l”
ca
p
tu
re
s
w
h
et
h
er
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l
p
ol
ic
y
in
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
th
at
h
av
e
ca
p
it
al
co
n
tr
ol
st
ra
te
gi
ca
ll
y
re
ac
t
to
p
ol
ic
ie
s
in
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
th
a
t
a
ls
o
h
av
e
ca
p
it
a
l
co
n
tr
o
l.
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
o
n
ot
h
er
sp
at
ia
l
la
gs
ca
n
b
e
in
te
rp
re
te
d
si
m
il
ar
ly
.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
b
y
G
M
M
C
U
E
IV
es
ti
m
at
io
n
.
E
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
sp
at
ia
l
la
gs
,
ot
h
er
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
tw
o
-y
ea
r
la
g
g
ed
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0
.0
5,
*
p
<
0.
1.
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
te
st
u
se
s
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
a
a
p
rk
L
M
st
a
ti
st
ic
.
H
a
n
se
n
’s
J
st
a
ti
st
ic
is
u
se
d
to
d
et
er
m
in
e
th
e
va
li
d
it
y
of
th
e
ov
er
id
en
ti
fy
in
g
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
in
a
G
M
M
m
o
d
el
,
an
d
h
ig
h
p
va
lu
e
in
d
ic
a
te
s
va
li
d
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
a
p
rk
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
is
u
se
d
fo
r
w
ea
k
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
te
st
.
46
T
ab
le
1.
6:
R
es
u
lt
s
of
D
iff
er
en
ti
at
in
g
T
ra
n
sb
ou
n
d
ar
y
S
p
il
lo
ve
rs
,
A
ll
W
ei
gh
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
O
x
id
iz
ed
S
u
lp
h
u
r
P
ol
ic
y
W
ei
gh
ti
n
g
M
at
ri
x
S
im
p
le
A
ve
ra
ge
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
O
p
en
n
es
s
S
im
il
ar
it
y
o
f
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
S
p
at
ia
l
L
ag
of
O
x
id
iz
ed
S
u
lp
h
u
r
P
o
li
cy
1.
02
9*
*
0.
6
13
0
.8
0
4*
0.
6
12
**
*
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.3
92
)
(0
.4
87
)
(0
.1
9
4)
S
p
il
l-
ou
ts
:
fr
ac
ti
on
of
em
is
si
o
n
s
d
ep
os
it
ed
on
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
0.
01
16
0.
0
15
4*
0.
0
10
3
0
.0
1
92
**
(0
.0
08
81
)
(0
.0
0
91
8)
(0
.0
10
1)
(0
.0
0
90
7)
S
p
il
l-
in
s:
p
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
d
ep
os
it
io
n
s
tr
an
sp
o
rt
ed
fr
om
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
(l
og
)
0.
50
4*
**
0
.4
9
8*
**
0
.5
1
0*
**
0.
4
29
**
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
76
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.2
1
1)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
44
1
4
41
44
1
4
38
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
88
6
0
.8
8
9
0.
8
87
0
.8
5
7
C
o
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
T
re
n
d
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
C
o
u
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
T
es
t
p
V
al
u
e
0
0
0
0
H
an
se
n
’s
J
p
V
a
lu
e
0.
85
7
0.
6
65
0
.2
9
9
0
.3
2
7
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
aa
p
rk
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
23
.2
4
2
5.
3
7
10
.0
3
1
2.
5
9
N
o
te
s:
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
of
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s,
co
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
,
ye
ar
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
is
fr
om
a
se
p
ar
at
e
re
gr
es
si
on
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
O
x
id
iz
ed
S
u
lp
h
u
r
P
ol
ic
y
w
h
ic
h
is
an
in
d
ex
on
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l
p
o
li
ci
es
o
f
ox
id
iz
ed
su
lp
h
u
r.
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
th
re
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
es
of
δ′ 1
,δ
2
,δ
3
fr
om
eq
u
at
io
n
(4
.3
).
T
w
o
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
th
e
ox
id
iz
ed
su
lp
h
u
r
sp
il
lo
ve
rs
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s.
S
p
il
l-
ou
ts
ca
p
tu
re
s
th
e
ox
id
iz
ed
su
lp
h
u
r
p
ol
lu
ti
on
d
ep
os
it
io
n
s
em
it
te
d
fr
om
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
a
n
d
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
ed
to
o
th
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s,
w
h
ic
h
ar
e
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
fr
ac
ti
on
of
to
ta
l
em
is
si
on
s
th
at
ar
e
d
ep
os
it
ed
on
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
S
p
il
l-
in
s
ca
p
tu
re
s
th
e
ox
id
iz
ed
su
lp
h
u
r
p
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
d
ep
os
it
io
n
s
th
at
ar
e
or
ig
in
at
ed
fr
om
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
an
d
sp
il
le
d
in
si
d
e
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
u
se
d
fo
r
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
cl
u
d
es
o
n
ly
2
1
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
O
th
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
th
at
ar
e
sp
ar
se
ly
lo
ca
te
d
in
d
iff
er
en
t
co
n
ti
n
en
ts
h
av
e
ve
ry
li
m
it
ed
p
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
sp
il
lo
ve
rs
b
et
w
ee
n
th
em
,
w
h
ic
h
ar
e
th
u
s
n
ot
co
n
si
d
er
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
b
y
G
M
M
C
U
E
IV
es
ti
m
at
io
n
.
E
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
sp
at
ia
l
la
g,
ot
h
er
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
tw
o
-y
ea
r
la
g
g
ed
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
**
*
p
<
0
.0
1,
**
p
<
0
.0
5,
*
p
<
0.
1.
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
te
st
u
se
s
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
a
p
rk
L
M
st
a
ti
st
ic
.
H
a
n
se
n
’s
J
st
at
is
ti
c
is
u
se
d
to
d
et
er
m
in
e
th
e
va
li
d
it
y
of
th
e
ov
er
id
en
ti
fy
in
g
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
in
a
G
M
M
m
o
d
el
,
an
d
h
ig
h
p
va
lu
e
in
d
ic
a
te
s
va
li
d
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
rk
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
is
u
se
d
fo
r
w
ea
k
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
te
st
.
47
T
ab
le
1.
7:
R
es
u
lt
s
of
E
U
an
d
n
on
-E
U
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s,
A
ll
W
ei
gh
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
E
n
v
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
P
ol
ic
y
S
tr
in
g
en
cy
(E
P
S
)
W
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
M
at
ri
x
S
im
p
le
A
v
er
ag
e
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
O
p
en
n
es
s
S
im
il
ar
it
y
of
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
*
S
p
a
ti
al
la
g
of
E
U
0
.8
99
**
*
0
.8
58
**
*
0.
73
6*
**
0.
36
3
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.2
32
)
(0
.2
1
7)
(0
.4
25
)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
*
S
p
a
ti
al
la
g
of
n
on
-E
U
0
.0
48
-0
.1
36
0.
10
9
1.
21
6*
**
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.2
5
1)
(0
.3
3)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
n
ot
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
o
f
E
U
0.
66
9*
*
0
.4
73
*
0.
56
1*
*
0.
49
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.2
4
5)
(0
.4
78
)
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
n
ot
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
o
f
n
on
-E
U
0
.2
24
0.
22
7
0
.1
78
0.
64
8*
(0
.2
99
)
(0
.3
01
)
(0
.2
4
8)
(0
.3
35
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
5
46
5
46
5
46
54
3
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0
.8
87
0
.8
91
0
.8
76
0.
82
1
C
o
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
T
re
n
d
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
C
o
u
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
T
es
t
p
V
al
u
e
0
0
0
0.
12
6
H
an
se
n
’s
J
p
V
al
u
e
0.
36
9
0
.2
29
0
.1
85
0.
11
4
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
aa
p
rk
W
al
d
F
st
at
is
ti
c
11
.0
6
1
1.
76
1
4.
71
1.
43
N
o
te
s:
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
of
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
ab
le
s,
co
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
,
ye
a
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t.
E
ac
h
co
lu
m
n
is
fr
om
a
se
p
ar
a
te
re
gr
es
si
on
.
T
h
er
e
ar
e
fo
u
r
sp
at
ia
l
la
gs
in
ea
ch
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
w
h
ic
h
a
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
b
as
ed
on
w
h
et
h
er
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
or
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
a
re
in
E
U
.
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
o
n
va
ri
a
b
le
”
S
p
a
ti
a
l
la
g
o
f
E
U
*
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
”
ca
p
tu
re
s
w
h
et
h
er
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l
p
ol
ic
y
in
h
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
th
at
is
in
E
U
st
ra
te
g
ic
a
ll
y
re
a
ct
to
p
ol
ic
y
ch
an
ge
s
in
ot
h
er
E
U
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
T
h
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
o
n
o
th
er
sp
at
ia
l
la
g
s
ca
n
b
e
in
te
rp
re
te
d
si
m
il
a
rl
y.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
b
y
G
M
M
C
U
E
IV
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
.
E
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
sp
a
ti
a
l
la
g
s,
ot
h
er
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
tw
o
-
ye
ar
la
gg
ed
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
*
**
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1.
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
te
st
u
se
s
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
rk
L
M
st
at
is
ti
c.
H
an
se
n
’s
J
st
at
is
ti
c
is
u
se
d
to
d
et
er
m
in
e
th
e
va
li
d
it
y
of
th
e
ov
er
id
en
ti
fy
in
g
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
in
a
G
M
M
m
o
d
el
,
an
d
h
ig
h
p
va
lu
e
in
d
ic
at
es
va
li
d
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
ap
rk
W
al
d
F
st
a
ti
st
ic
is
u
se
d
fo
r
w
ea
k
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
te
st
.
48
T
ab
le
1.
8:
R
es
u
lt
s
of
th
e
E
ff
ec
t
of
E
u
ro
zo
n
e
on
E
U
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s,
A
ll
W
ei
gh
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
E
n
v
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
P
ol
ic
y
S
tr
in
g
en
cy
(E
P
S
)
W
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
M
at
ri
x
S
im
p
le
A
ve
ra
ge
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
O
p
en
n
es
s
S
im
il
ar
it
y
of
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
E
u
ro
zo
n
e
*
H
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
*
S
p
a
ti
a
l
la
g
o
f
E
U
0
.6
83
**
*
0
.6
00
**
*
0.
57
0*
**
3.
74
9
(0
.1
5
5)
(0
.1
4
2)
(0
.1
52
)
(3
.9
92
)
H
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
of
E
U
0.
44
2*
0.
52
9*
*
0.
55
3*
**
-2
7.
39
**
*
(0
.2
4
0)
(0
.2
1
6)
(0
.2
06
)
(7
.8
29
)
H
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
of
n
o
n
-E
U
-0
.2
85
-0
.2
5
2
-0
.2
20
4.
74
5
(0
.2
5
1)
(0
.2
3
5)
(0
.2
41
)
(3
.9
21
)
H
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
n
ot
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
of
E
U
-0
.2
42
-0
.2
0
9
-0
.0
33
6
-3
4.
20
**
*
(0
.3
2
8)
(0
.2
8
6)
(0
.2
67
)
(9
.8
44
)
H
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
n
ot
in
E
U
*
S
p
at
ia
l
la
g
of
n
o
n
-E
U
0.
47
5
0.
53
4*
0.
32
5
14
.4
2*
**
(0
.2
9
4)
(0
.2
8
3)
(0
.2
30
)
(5
.1
04
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
54
6
54
6
54
6
54
3
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.8
96
0.
89
7
0.
89
0
-3
6.
70
5
C
ou
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
T
re
n
d
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
C
ou
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
T
es
t
p
V
a
lu
e
0
0
0
0.
08
44
H
a
n
se
n
’s
J
p
V
al
u
e
0.
60
8
0.
56
4
0.
33
4
0.
19
7
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
a
ap
rk
W
a
ld
F
st
a
ti
st
ic
10
.9
7
1
0.
44
12
.2
1
1.
51
4
N
o
te
s:
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s,
co
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
,
ye
a
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t.
E
ac
h
co
lu
m
n
is
fr
om
a
se
p
a
ra
te
re
gr
es
si
on
.
T
h
er
e
ar
e
fi
ve
sp
a
ti
a
l
la
g
s
in
ea
ch
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
w
h
ic
h
a
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
b
as
ed
on
w
h
et
h
er
ot
h
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
or
h
om
e
co
u
n
tr
y
a
re
in
E
U
.
T
h
e
va
ri
a
b
le
“
E
u
ro
zo
n
e”
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
a
n
d
eq
u
a
ls
to
1
if
th
is
co
u
n
tr
y
is
in
eu
ro
ar
ea
th
at
ye
ar
.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
b
y
G
M
M
C
U
E
IV
es
ti
m
at
io
n
.
E
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
sp
at
ia
l
la
g
s,
o
th
er
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
tw
o
-
ye
ar
la
gg
ed
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
*
**
p
<
0.
0
1,
*
*
p
<
0.
0
5,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
U
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
te
st
u
se
s
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
rk
L
M
st
at
is
ti
c.
H
an
se
n
’s
J
st
a
ti
st
ic
is
u
se
d
to
d
et
er
m
in
e
th
e
va
li
d
it
y
of
th
e
ov
er
id
en
ti
fy
in
g
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
in
a
G
M
M
m
o
d
el
,
an
d
h
ig
h
p
va
lu
e
in
d
ic
at
es
va
li
d
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
ap
rk
W
al
d
F
st
a
ti
st
ic
is
u
se
d
fo
r
w
ea
k
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
te
st
.
49
1.7 Appendices
Table 1.9: Variables and Data Source
Variables Source
Stringency of environmental policy OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS)
Democracy (simple average of Political Right and Civil Liberty) Freedom House
Government fractionalization, Checks and balances Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
Sulphur transport matrix European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP)
GDP per capita (log), Openness Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra, et al. 2015)
Corporate income tax rate OECD
Urbanization, Population related variables World Bank’s World Development Indicators database
Political Constraint Index Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset (Henisz, 2000)
Table 1.10: List of Countries and EU Membership
EU Countries non-EU Countries
Austria (1995), Belgium Australia, Canada
Czech Republic (2004), Denmark, Finland (1995) Japan, Republic of Korea
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (2004) Norway, Switzerland
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands Turkey, United States
Poland (2004), Portugal, Slovakia (2004)
Spain, Sweden (1995), United Kingdom
Notes: For countries with brackets, the regarding number inside the brackets is the year of
becoming a European Union member. For countries without brackets in the column of EU
Countries, they are EU members for the whole period of our dataset.
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Table 1.11: Robustness, Control Variables are One-Year Lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighting Matrix Simple Average GDP per
capita
Openness Similarity
of income
per capita
Spatial Lag 0.284 0.28 0.26 1.221***
(0.553) (0.74) (0.444) (0.283)
Observations 572 572 572 568
R-squared 0.895 0.895 0.896 0.845
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0 0 0
Hansen’s J p Value 0.283 0.365 0.55 0.44
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 16.77 10.4 16.22 14.62
Notes: All specifications include a full set of control variables, country-specific trend, year fixed effect and
country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression. Coefficients are estimates of δ1 from equation
(4.1) except that control variables are one-year lagged instead of two-year lagged.
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include democ-
racy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same weighting scheme
as the spatial lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidenti-
fication test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Table 1.12: Robustness, Control Variables are Three-Year Lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighting Matrix Simple Average GDP per
capita
Openness Similarity
of income
per capita
Spatial Lag 0.547 0.399 0.533 1.475***
(0.53) (0.568) (0.359) (0.34)
Observations 520 520 520 518
R-squared 0.895 0.894 0.895 0.82
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0 0 0
Hansen’s J p Value 0.541 0.307 0.682 0.24
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 15.17 14.7 18.11 11.74
Notes: All specifications include a full set of control variables, country-specific trend, year fixed effect and
country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression. Coefficients are estimates of δ1 from equation
(4.1) except that control variables are three-year lagged instead of two-year lagged.
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include democ-
racy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same weighting scheme
as the spatial lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidenti-
fication test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Table 1.13: Robustness, Include Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighting Matrix Simple Average GDP per
capita
Openness Similarity
of Income
per capita
Spatial Lag 0.851* 0.953* 0.45 0.827***
(0.469) (0.559) (0.325) (0.208)
Lagged EPS 0.515*** 0.507*** 0.539*** 0.536***
(0.0557) (0.0597) (0.0521) (0.055)
Observations 546 546 546 543
R-squared 0.921 0.92 0.924 0.901
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0 0 0
Hansen’s J p Value 0.683 0.231 0.186 0.186
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 17.64 14.38 17.56 17.56
Notes: All specifications include a full set of control variables, country-specific trend, year fixed effect and
country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression. Coefficients are estimates of δ1 from equation
(4.1) except that one-year lagged dependent variable is also included.
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include democ-
racy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same weighting scheme
as the spatial lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidenti-
fication test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Table 1.14: Robustness, Recalculated EPS, not Consider CO2 Trading Scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recalculated Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighting Matrix Simple Average GDP per
capita
Openness Similarity
of income
per capita
Spatial Lag 1.368 0.353 -0.767 1.372***
(1.573) (1.521) (0.976) (0.353)
Observations 546 546 546 543
R-squared 0.874 0.879 0.863 0.802
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0.0978 0.0387 0.0012 0.00123
Hansen’s J p Value 0.807 0.811 0.532 0.737
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 2.154 2.556 4.701 11.55
Notes: The dependent variable and spatial lag are constructed using recalculated EPS. In the constructed of
index on environmental policy, recalculated EPS doesn’t consider the carbon price in CO2 trading system to
avoid the correlation across countries in the calculation. All specifications include a full set of control variables,
country-specific trend, year fixed effect and country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression.
Coefficients are estimates of δ1 from equation (4.1).
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include democ-
racy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same weighting scheme
as the spatial lag. Except for spatial lag, other control variables are two-year lagged. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidentification test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic.
Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and
high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Table 1.15: Robustness, Use Spatial Lag that are Two Years in the Future
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recalculated Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS)
Weighting Matrix Simple Average GDP per
capita
Openness Similarity
of income
per capita
Spatial Lag 0.218 0.450 0.207 0.376
(0.240) (0.290) (0.199) (0.257)
Observations 494 494 494 493
R-squared 0.895 0.890 0.893 0.893
Country-specific Trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Underidentification Test p Value 0 0 0 0.0291
Hansen’s J p Value 0.00138 0.000441 0.000349 0.210
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 45.81 31.96 48.39 5.454
Notes: All specifications include a full set of control variables, country-specific trend, year fixed effect and
country fixed effect. Each column is from a separate regression. The spatial lag is two years in the future.
All specifications are estimated by GMM CUE IV estimation. Instrument sets for the spatial lag include democ-
racy, government fractionalization, checks and balances from other countries, using the same weighting scheme
as the spatial lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Underidenti-
fication test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. Hansen’s J statistic is used to determine the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions in a GMM model, and high p value indicates valid instruments. Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic is used for weak instruments test.
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Essay 2
Tax Competition and Social Dilemma: A Laboratory
Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Tax competition exists when governments use low tax rates, tax subsidies, and other
tools to attract an inflow of productive taxable resources. One example of such
competition from 2017 is that to entice Amazon’s second headquarter to its locality, more
than 200 cities in Canada, Mexico, and the United States offered tax breaks and other
incentives. One of the winners in this race, New York City, planned to give Amazon tax
breaks of at least $1.525 billion and cash grants of $325 million.
Tax competition has been extensively studied in economics and political science, both
theoretically and empirically. One challenge is that it is difficult to empirically test some
predictions from theoretical works due to lack of data. Moreover, the identification in
empirical works tend to be plagued by endogeneity problems. In this paper, I adopt a
theory-based experimental approach to explore how regions choose tax policies when facing
tax competition. From the best of my knowledge, there is no previous paper using
experimental methods to test tax competition predictions; this paper serves as a first
attempt.
In a standard tax competition model (see, for example, Zodrow and Mieszkowki, 1986;
Wilson, 1986; Barrett, 1994; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004),1 there are n (n >= 2) regions
1There are some excellent surveys, including Wilson (1999), Keen and Konard (2013), and Boadway and
Tremblay (2012).
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sharing a mobile productive resource base, which is the tax base as well. One widely used
example of productive resources is capital, which is also the example used in this paper.
Capital is assumed to flow freely across the regions, and thus earn the same return to
capital in each region. The government in each region chooses tax policies on capital to
maximize social welfare and uses capital tax revenue to finance public goods. The local
social welfare depends on both public goods and private production output. To attract
capital, governments have an incentive to choose sub-optimally low tax rates. The Nash
equilibrium tax rate is lower than the efficient tax rate that maximizes total social welfare.
Tax competition can be characterized as a social dilemma. When local governments pursue
their local interests and choose inefficiently low tax rates, the overall interest will be
harmed. The residents’ welfare that results from the Nash equilibrium is below the Pareto
optimal level.
I use the tax competition model to formalize the experiments and design treatments to
test some main theoretical predictions: (1) the equilibrium tax rates are lower than efficient
tax rates; (2) keeping the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rates constant, the number
of competing regions does not directly affect equilibrium tax rates; (3) how sensitive the
capital movement is to tax rates significantly negatively affects equilibrium tax rates. I also
explore the effects of two policy instruments that have the potential to mitigate the
inefficiency, namely a minimum tax rate constraint and communication. These policies
have been proposed in the real world. The Ruding Committee (Report of the Committee of
Independent Experts on Company Taxation, 1992) proposed setting a minimum corporate
tax rate of 30% in the EU, and there has been continuous efforts on harmonization of
corporate tax systems. As regards communication, there has been substantial efforts and
conversations among governments in an attempt to reach partial tax harmonization. In
this essay, the minimum tax rate constraint and communication are the two policies
studied. The theoretical predictions for the two policies are: (4) when the minimum tax
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rate constraint is higher than equilibrium tax rate, regions choose the minimum tax rate;
(5) communication does not change equilibrium tax policies.
I find that observed tax rates are significantly lower than efficient levels, and in some
cases, they are even lower than predicted equilibrium tax rates. The sensitivity of capital
movement has a significant effect on tax choices, and the relationship is negative, but the
observed scale of the impact is much smaller than theoretical predictions. The number of
competing regions, on the other hand, has a direct, significant, and large effect on tax rate
choices. This effect has been generally overlooked in the theoretical literature. Minimum
tax constraint increases tax rates mainly through compulsively pulling of tax rates to the
binding minimum tax rates. Communication significantly increases tax rates and social
welfare by promoting cooperative policies and adopting efficient tax rates among
competing regions. Cooperation becomes harder to form with more competing regions.
A laboratory experiment is a powerful tool to examine the tax policies facing tax
competition. One advantage of the lab experiment is that we can create a controlled
environment in which the differences between treatments are the only factors that we
intend to investigate. The effects of these factors are difficult to test using real-world data
due to the lack of counterfactual data. Other econometric issues, such as endogeneity and
missing variables, also disturbs the estimates. Moreover, using experimental data, we are
able to compare the observed behaviors with predicted and efficient tax rates, which is an
advantage compared with the empirical research where predicted and efficient tax rates are
unknown.
As a first attempt to test tax competition model predictions in a laboratory
experiment, I intend to design the experiment to be simple enough to capture the
characteristics of tax competition. How governments change tax rates and make policies is
a complicated process. The model and experiment used in this paper do not include some
features, such as political institution and government structure, that play important roles
in policymaking in the real world. I believe that the experiments’ simplicity is able to
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reduce subjects’ confusion. While I use the language of tax competition to describe the
environment, the setup is applicable to other situations where competition distorts
behaviors from efficient levels.
The results in this paper also have several implications for future research and
policymaking. Regarding tax competition, it is necessary to take the effect of the number
of competing regions into account for both empirical and theoretical works. The
experimental observations and results help to motivate further theoretical developments to
better fit observed facts. The new theories can then be tested with a new field or
laboratory results. The limited effect of the sensitivity of capital movement also calls for an
adjustment to and accommodation of theoretical work. Moreover, promoting better and
more effective communication among governments would be beneficial in reconciling the
inefficiencies caused by tax competition.
Tax competition can be characterized as a social dilemma. Other examples of social
dilemma include public goods game, prisoner’s dilemma, trust game, and others. Many
experiments find players’ behaviors are different from the Nash equilibrium predicted when
assuming self-regarding (or homo economicus) preference. For example, in a public goods
game, the contribution to public goods is significantly higher than homo economicus
predictions (see Ledyard, 1994 and Chaudhuri, 2011 for review). Behavioral economic
theory provides a wide range of models to explain the cooperation, such as inequality
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), reciprocal preferences (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et al., 2008), and altruism (Andreoni, 1989;
Andreoni, 1990).
There are other games and experiments that share similarity with tax competition.
When competing governments use low tax rate to attract mobile tax base, such as capital,
it’s similar to a contest game. In a contest game, several rival parties expend resources in
trying to secure a prize or rent for themselves (Abbink, et al., 20102). Tullock’s (1967,
2Konrad (2007, 2009) provides recent surveys of the theoretical literature on contest models.
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1980) lottery contest game is one of the most studied. Extensive experimental studies
(Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Sheremeta, 2010) have investigated the contest game and
test whether the observed behavior is consistent with standard Nash equilibrium
predictions. Many experiments find that the efforts and expenditures exceed theoretical
predictions (i.e. overbidding). Possible explanations include non-monetary utility from
winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014), and
spiteful preferences and inequality aversion (Bartling et al., 2009; Balafoutas et al., 2012).
The rest of this essay proceeds as follows. Model setting and theoretical predictions
are provided in section 2. Section 3 and 4 present experimental design and protocol.
Section 5 lays out the results. Section 6 concludes. The appendix provides an example of
subject instructions.
2.2 Theoretical Model
In this section, I lay out the primitives of the model and derive the equilibrium under
the assumption that agents are purely selfish. The model is based on Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986), Wildasin (1988), and Wilson (1991). In the model, consider n > 1
competing regions, indexed by i = 1, 2. . . , n. The competing regions face mobile capital
and use a capital tax to finance public goods. The capital tax rate, in turn, affects the
capital movement. I start by discussing the basic model in which there are two symmetric
regions. Then I extend the basic model to consider the case where the number of regions is
more than two.
2.2.1 Basic Model
Assume there are two regions i = 1, 2. The regions are symmetric and identical, which
means they have the same number of identical residents, same production function and
same technology. There is a fixed national total capital stock, and each region has the
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same initial capital endowment, k1 = k2 = k
∗. Assume each region has one resident who
participates in the production process. The production function3 is F (ki, 1) = f(ki). The
government in each region levies taxes on capital, ti. Capital flows freely across the two
regions to earn the same net of tax return in each region, f
′
(k1)− t1 = f ′(k2)− t2, where
t1, t2 are the tax rate per unit of capital. Since the two regions are otherwise identical,
more capital will flow to the region with the lower capital tax rate.
The government uses tax revenues from the capital tax to finance fully congested
public services, gi. Local governments face a hard budget constraint, gi = ti ∗ ki, and
choose a capital tax rate to maximize the utility of a representative resident. The resident
gets utility, Ui(ci, gi), from both private goods, ci, and public goods consumption, gi. The
resident spends all of his income on private goods, ci. The tradeoff for governments is that
it has incentives to lower tax rates in order to attract more capital, which produces more
output. However, since tax revenue is the multiplication of tax rates and the amount of
capital, lower tax rates do not necessarily increase the tax revenue and public goods
provided. At the extreme, when the tax rate is zero, the region is able to attract a large
amount of the capital, but there would be no tax revenue to finance public goods.
To be more specific, assume the production function to be f(ki) = βki − αk2i . We
choose positive α, β so that the production function is positive, concave, twice
differentiable and strictly increasing for all possible ki.
4 The welfare function for a
representative resident is Ui(ci, gi) = ci ∗ gi, where ci = βki − ti ∗ ki = (β − ti) ∗ ki. Since
ci, ki ≥ 0, β − ti ≥ 0.5 The utility function is strictly increasing, concave, twice
3Model predictions and results are similar if we consider there to be L residents. Assume the production
function to be F (K,L) and the function has constant return to scale, F (K,L)L = F (
K
L , 1) = F (ki, 1) = f(ki).
In this setting, ki is the capital per capita, and f(ki) is the output per capita.
4This means ki[0, 2k
∗].
5In the tax competition literature, we usually assume that each resident owns an identical share of the
regional capital, k∗, and earns income through labor and capital. The income is thus, [f(ki)−f ′(ki)ki]+rk∗ =
[βki − αk2i − (β − 2αki)ki] + (β − 2αki − ti)k∗ = βki − tiki − αk2i + (k∗ − ki) ∗ (β − 2α− ti). I simplify the
consumption function to let the model be better used in the experiment without losing the key features of
the game, ci = βki − tiki.
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differentiable. Thus, the welfare function for a representative resident is:
Ui(ci, gi) = ci ∗ gi = (βki − tiki) ∗ tiki (2.2.1)
2.2.2 Equilibrium Tax Rates
I now derive the indirect preferences of agents over tax rates and characterize the Nash
equilibrium. Capital moves freely across regions to earn the same net return,
β − 2αk1 − t1 = β − 2αk2 − t2, which can be simplified as: 2αk1 + t1 = 2αk2 + t2. The total
fixed capital supply is given by k1 + k2 = k1 + k2 = 2k
∗. From the above two equations, we
can derive the capital per capita function in region 1 follows:
k1 = k
∗ +
1
4α
∗ (t2 − t1) (2.2.2)
The equation 2.2.2 shows that the capital in region 1 is directly determined by the tax rate
difference between the competing regions. The intuition for this equation is
straightforward. When the competing region (region 2) increases its tax rate, some capital
will flow into the home region (region 1), which increases the capital per capita in home
region. The same happens when the home region reduces its tax rates. The effect of a
change in the home region tax rate on capital is given by:
∂ki
/
∂ti =
−1
4α
i = 1, 2 (2.2.3)
We call the effect of tax rate change on capital movement, 1
4α
, as “the sensitivity of capital
per capita to tax rate change.” I also “the sensitivity” and “sensitivity of capital
movement” to refer to this effect for short. When α increases, the absolute value of this
effect decreases, which means capital is less sensitive to a tax rate change. The sensitivity
to the ax rate is an important dimension that I change in the experiment.
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Inserting the capital function into the objective function, we have:
Maxti : Ui(ci, gi) = ci ∗gi = (β(k∗+ 14α ∗(tj− ti))− ti(k∗+ 14α ∗(tj− ti)))∗ ti(k∗+ 14α ∗(tj− ti)).
The Nash tax rate choices for region i is characterized by the first order condition:
∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ti
= ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ci
∂ci
∂ti
+ ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂gi
∂gi
∂ti
= −φ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ci
+ (ki − ti 14α)∂Ui(ci,gi)∂gi = 0, where
φ = ki − ti 14α + β 14α Rewrite this equation, we get:
∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ci
∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂gi
=
ki − ti 14α
φ
(2.2.4)
Solving the above equation 2.2.4 for both regions, we can derive the Nash equilibrium tax
rates, tN . Since β, α > 0, then β 1
4α
> 0. Thus
ki−ti 14α
φ
< 1. It follows that
∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ci
< ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂gi
, which means that the marginal utility of public goods consumption is
larger than private goods consumption. While the optimal public goods provision, the gi
that maximizes social welfare, follows the first order condition, ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂ci
= ∂Ui(ci,gi)
∂gi
. So, we
know that public goods in the Nash equilibrium tax rates are less than the amount that
maximizes social welfare. The under-provision of public goods also implies that the Nash
equilibrium tax rate is lower than the optimal tax rate. We can derive the optimal tax rate
by solving the first order condition in the optimum, which follows from
(∂Ui(ci,gi))
∂ci
(∂Ui(ci,gi))
∂gi
= tiki
βki−tiki = 1. Thus, the optimal tax rate, denoted t
O, is β/2.
Moreover, the sensitivity of capital movement is related to tax rates and thus public
goods provision.
∂(
ki−ti 14α
φ
)
∂ 1
4α
=
−ti
φ
− (ki − ti
1
4α
) ∗ (β − ti)
φ2
(2.2.5)
Since β − ti ≥ 0, it follows that φ = ki + 14α ∗ (β − ti) ≥ 0 and (ki − ti 14α) ∗ (β − ti) > 0.
Thus the right hand of equation 2.2.5 is negative, which means that there is a inverse
relationship between sensitivity and the equilibrium tax rate. The results here are also
65
consistent with the predictions from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1991)
that tax rates will be lower than optimal, so that the public good will be under-provided.
2.2.3 n-region Case
Following Wildasin (1988), I also extend the basic model to n regions. Based on the
results in Wildasin (1988), in symmetric competition case with n identical regions, the
respective effect of the tax rate in region 1 and region 2 on capital is as follows:
∂k1
∂t1
= (
∂f
′
(k1)
∂k1
)−1 ∗ n− 1
n
(2.2.6)
∂k1
∂t2
= (
∂f
′
(k2)
∂k2
)−1 ∗ 1
n
(2.2.7)
The sensitivity of capital to tax rates, i.e., the absolute value of ∂ki
∂ti
, is positively related
with the number of regions, n. Keeping the production function parameters constant, if we
increase the number of regions from 2 to 3, the sensitivity would increase from
|(∂f
′
(k1)
∂k1
)−1 ∗ 1
2
| to |(∂f
′
(k1)
∂k1
)−1 ∗ 2
3
|. Since there is a inverse relationship between the
sensitivity and equilibrium tax rate, the higher sensitivity of capital movement results in a
lower Nash equilibrium tax rate and public goods provision. On the other hand, if we
increase the number of competing regions and keep the sensitivity constant through
adjusting the production function parameters, the tax rate in equilibrium will not change
with more competing regions (Wildasin, 1988).
2.3 Experimental Design and Predictions
I test the theoretical predictions through controlled laboratory experiments. I
introduce subjects to a game that has the same structure as the one presented in the
theoretical model. Every subject is randomly grouped with another anonymous subject,
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indexed by i =1, 2. Subjects are required to choose the tax rates on capital between 0 and
80%. Subjects’ payoff depends on the welfare in their represented region, which is
consistent with theoretical model where local governments’ objective is to maximize welfare
in its region. The parameters are set as k∗ = 120, β = 1. The local welfare, i.e., the payoff
function, thus is Ui(ci, gi) = (ki − tiki) ∗ tiki. The value of α differs across treatments in
order to allow different sensitivity of capital movement to tax rates. From Section 2, we
know the optimal tax rate is tOi = β/2 = 50%, and the optimal public goods provision is
3600.
The treatments vary across the following dimensions: the number of competing regions
(2 or 3) and the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rate. There are also two policy
instrument treatments, namely a minimum tax rate constraint and communication. In
total, we have seven treatments.
2.3.1 Treatments
2-Region Low Sensitivity Treatment
The first treatment is the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment. In this treatment,
α = 1/1200, so that every 1 percentage point change in the local tax rate will cause
1
4α
∗ 0.01 = 300 ∗ 0.01 = 3 units of capital to move. With everything else constant, if region
1 increases its tax rate by 1 percentage point, 3 units of capital will move out from this
region to the competing region, and vice versa. The sensitivity of capital movement to tax
rate is 3.
The response function of region 1 to the tax rate of region 2 is:
t1 =
t2
4
−
√
100t22 − 20t2 + 201
40
− 19
40
ift2 < 0.6596
t1 = t2 − 0.4 ift2 >= 0.6596
(2.3.1)
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The response function is shown in Fig. 2.1. The horizontal axis is region 2’s tax rates, and
the vertical axis is region 1’s tax rates that maximize its social welfare given region 2’s tax
rate. If we draw the both regions’ responses functions in one graph, the intersection is the
Nash equilibrium predicted tax rate, presented in Fig. 2.2. The intersection, and thus the
Nash equilibrium tax rate, is 16.15
Figure 2.1: Response Functions
3-Region Low Sensitivity Treatment
The second treatment is the 3-Region Low Sensitivity treatment. The main difference
from the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment is that there are 3 competing regions in a
group instead of 2. The sensitivity of capital movement with respect to the tax rate is the
same, which means that every one percentage point change in local tax rate will cause 3
units of the capital movement. Thus, the payoff function, Pareto-efficient level, and Nash
equilibrium are also the same. To make the sensitivity of capital movement the same as
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Figure 2.2: Response Functions and Equilibrium Tax Rates
with 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment, we need to change the parameter of the
production function, α, and set α = 3
4
∗ 1
1200
.
3-Region High Sensitivity Treatment
In the third treatment, the 3-Region High Sensitivity treatment, we keep the
production function constant and increase the number of competing regions. The
sensitivity of capital movement to tax rate increases from 3 to 4, so every one percentage
point change in the local tax rate will cause four units of capital to move. Other parameters
stay the same as in the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment. The Pareto-efficient tax rate
level is still 50%. The Nash equilibrium tax rate decreases to 12.8%.
2-Region High Sensitivity Treatment
As I mentioned above, the increase in the number of competing regions also raises the
capital movement sensitivity to tax rate changes. In order to disentangle the effects caused
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by changes in the sensitivity from the number of competing regions, I construct the fourth
treatment, 2-Region High Sensitivity treatment. The capital sensitivity is the same as the
sensitivity in the 3-Region High Sensitivity treatment, i.e., I set α = 4
3
∗ 1
1200
). The number
of competing regions is 2, which is the same as in the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment.
The Pareto-efficient tax rate level is still 50% and public goods provision is 25. The Nash
equilibrium tax rate is the same as the 3-Region High Sensitivity treatment, 12.8%.
From the above treatments, I disentangle the effects caused by the number of
competing regions from the effects of capital sensitivity. If we keep the model parameters
fixed, the increase in the number of competing regions raises capital sensitivity to the tax
rate. The two factors change simultaneously. I thus set different parameters of the
production function to change one factor at a time, 2 or 3 regions, low or high sensitivity of
capital movement. This gives us four treatments. From the predictions of the theoretical
models, sensitivity of capital movement directly affects the predicted equilibrium tax rates.
If we increase the number of competing regions while keeping the sensitivity constant, the
predicted tax rate is unchanged. Comparing the experimental results among the four
treatments, we have a clear prediction of the effect of competition group size and
sensitivity on equilibrium tax rates.
Race to the Bottom Treatment
The fifth treatment, Race to the Bottom (RTB), is an extreme case of very high capital
sensitivity to tax rate change. The capital movement to tax rate change is so responsive
that all the capital will move to the region with the lower capital tax rate. We set α = 0 in
this treatment. In order to attract capital, regions would choose the lowest possible tax rate
to compete. In the experiment, the lowest possible tax rate is 0%. But when regions choose
tax rates to be 0%, the payoff is 0 no matter what tax rates the competing region choose.
When both regions choose 1%, the payoff is positive (238.56). If the competing region’s tax
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rate is 1%, home region can not earn more by diverging from 1% and choosing 0% or
higher tax rates. Both regions choosing 1% is the Nash equilibrium in this treatment.
Two Policy Instrument Treatments
We next consider the effects of two policies that have potentials to mitigate the
inefficiency from tax competition, namely minimum tax rate constraint and
communication. In the sixth treatment, Minimum Constraint treatment, a minimum
capital tax rate constraint that governments can levy is added. In particular, subjects
cannot choose a tax rate lower than 30%. Other characteristics and parameters are the
same as with the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment.
The last treatment, the Communication treatment, examines the effect of
communication in reducing tax competition inefficiency. Before the competing regions
make decisions on the capital tax rate, they have 60 seconds for cheap talk. During the 60
seconds, the regions in the same group are able to send messages to each other through
computers, making suggestions regarding choices of tax rates and possibly agreeing to tax
rates, but the agreement is not binding. Other characteristics and parameters are the same
as with the 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment.
Table 1 specifies the parameters used in each treatment and lists the Nash equilibrium
tax rate predictions for the regions. The first two columns shows the number and name of
each treatment. The third column and fourth column present the number of regions in a
group and the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rate change. A higher number
represents higher sensitivity, which would cause lower Nash equilibrium tax rates. The
number of competing regions, production function parameter α, and predicted Nash
equilibrium tax rates are also shown here. The number of observations in each treatment
are noted in the last columns. In each treatment, The Pareto-efficient tax rate level for all
treatments is 50% and public goods provision is 25.
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Table 2.1: Treatments, Parameters and Predictions
No. Treatment # of
Regions
Capital
Sensitiv-
ity
Parameter α Predicted
Tax
Rates
# of
Observa-
tions
1 2-Region Low Sensitivity 2 3 11200 16.15% 1950
2 3-Region Low Sensitivity 3 3 34 ∗ 11200 16.15% 1305
3 3-Region High Sensitivity 3 4 11200 12.80% 585
4 2-Region High Sensitivity 2 4 43 ∗ 11200 12.80% 1350
5 Race to the Bottom 2 120 0 1% 840
6 Minimum Constraint 2 3 11200 Minimum
(30%)
330
7 Communication 2 3 11200 16.15% 600
2.3.2 Hypotheses
In this section, I distill the theoretical results into testable hypotheses. Hypothesis 1
compares predicted tax rates with efficient tax rates. Hypotheses 2-5 refer to the effect of
different factors on equilibrium tax rates.
Hypothesis 1: the equilibrium tax rates are lower than efficient tax rates.
Hypothesis 2: keeping the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rates constant, the
number of competing regions does not directly affect equilibrium tax rates.
Hypothesis 3: how sensitive the capital movement is to tax rates significantly affect
equilibrium tax rates, and the relationship is negative.
Hypothesis 4: equilibrium tax rate is the same as a binding minimum tax constraint.
Hypothesis 5: communication does not change equilibrium tax policies.
2.4 Experimental Protocol
The subjects recruited for tne experiments are undergraduate students at Georgia
State University. All the experiments were conducted at the GSU Experimental Economics
Center. In each experiment session, subjects are exposed to two treatments. After finishing
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the two treatments, subjects’ risk preference and distributional preferences are elicited. In
total, there are four parts in each session. Twelve sessions were run. No subject
participated in more than one session. I use both a between and within subject design.
The currency of payoff which subjects earned in this experiment is called tokens. The
tokens were converted into dollars using the exchange rate: 300 Tokens = $1. Total
earnings for a certain subject was the sum of earnings in each of the four parts. One period
in every part was randomly selected at the end of each part, and the earning in the selected
rounds was paid to the subjects at the end of the experiment. There is also a $5 show-up
fee. Sessions lasted around 2 hours on average.
As mentioned, there are four parts in each experiment session. Part 1 and Part 2 of
each session are two treatments out of the seven possible treatments discussed in Section 3.
Each part lasted 15 identical periods. At the beginning of each part, subjects were divided
randomly into groups of two or three depending on the treatments. The subjects in the
same group represent competing regions. The group remains fixed within each part. At the
beginning of each period, subjects are given 120 units of capital. The capital is mobile
across subjects in the same group. Subjects simultaneously chose the capital tax rate
without knowing what rate the competing subjects in the same group chose. The capital
tax decision was allowed to be any whole number between 0 and 80 (%). After every
subject in the same group has made the decision, capital moves freely between regions so
that all capital earns the same net capital return.6 This process is executed automatically
by the computer.7 Then the payoff, which is the welfare, is calculated. Subjects then
received feedback that specified the following information of each subject in the same
group: the tax rate decision, the final amount of capital, amount of public goods and
6As calculated in Section 2, capital in region 1 is k1 = k
∗ + 14α ∗ (t2 − t1).
7One concern for the experiment is not using subjects to represent capital and residents. Our consider-
ation is that using human subjects will add much complexity to the experiment. Besides, the results will be
the confounding effect of capital mobility, resident’s consumption decision and tax competition. Considering
that our focus is tax competition, so for now we use computers to determine capital mobility and consump-
tion decision, subjects only need to decide capital tax rate. Since using subjects for capital and residents is
more realistic, it can be a future direction.
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private goods, and payoff. After the period was over, subjects moved on to the next
identical period. In all treatments, a built-in calculator was provided to help subjects
calculate hypothetical earnings from different capital tax rate choices. The calculator
appeared on subjects’ monitors. Subjects can enter their own capital tax rate decision and
a guess for the decision of the other competing region or regions. Then, the calculator will
compute the payoff for the subject in this hypothetical scenario, taking capital mobility
into account.
The third and fourth part are intended to elicit risk and distributional preferences of
subjects. Each part lasted 10 periods. Part 3 uses the method of Holt and Laury (2002) to
elicit risk preference. In each period of Part 3, subjects chose the preferred lottery to play
between two lotteries. The two lotteries have the same probability distribution of winning
a high prize or a low prize in a specific period. The key difference between the two lotteries
is the gap among the high and low prizes. One lottery has 400 tokens as the high prize and
320 as the low prize. The other lottery has 770 tokens as the high prize and 20 as the low
prize. The lottery with a small gap between high and low prizes is characterized as the
low-risk lottery. The other one with a large gap is characterized as the high-risk lottery.
Across periods, the high prize and low prize distributions of high-risk lottery and low-risk
lottery were kept fixed respectively, but the probability of winning high prize or low prize
differed. At the end of this part, one period was randomly selected, and the lottery in this
period was played. Subjects’ earning is the lottery prize earned in this selected prize.
In Part 4, I use the way of Fisman et al. (2007) and Fisman et al. (2017) to elicit
distributional preferences. In each period, subjects were randomly grouped with an
anonymous other subject, participated in a generalized dictator game, and divided an
endowment between self and the other group member. The subject was free to allocate a
unit endowment in any way she wishes within the budget constraint, pspis + popio = 1,
where pis and pio denote the payoffs to self and other, respectively, and p = po/ps is the
relative price of redistribution. At the end of this part, one period was randomly selected,
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and subjects’ earning was the sum of endowment allocated to self and the endowment
received from the other group member.
Subjects also participated in 3 periods of practice before being engaged in the four
parts in each experiment session. Practice periods are very similar to the 2-Region Low
Sensitivity treatment, except that the amount of capital is fixed, not mobile. Other
characteristics are the same. The practice serves two main learning purposes. First is to
learn to balance the provision of public good and private goods by setting the proper tax
rate. The second is to learn the socially optimal tax rate, which is the same whether the
capital is mobile or not. When the capital is not mobile as in the practice periods, the
Nash equilibrium tax rate is the same as the optimal tax rate. This learning experience
enables subjects to know the optimal tax rate that maximizes the national welfare before
being exposed to the tax competition. Subjects were not paid for these periods.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. Basic
demographic information of subjects, such as age, race, and gender, was collected. In
addition, questions regarding their competition motives, winning goal, and understanding
of the experiment were also asked. All the questions can be found in Appendix. In
particular, subjects choose the degree of agreement with the following statements:
• Statement1: I choose the decision number low so that the number of resources will
relatively large;
• Statement2: I concentrated more on getting more resources than earning of points;
• Statement3: I choose the decision number to get more resources than the other group
member;
• Statement4: I choose the decision number to earn more than the other group member;
• Statement5: I increase decision number to increase the payment to the other group
member;
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• Statement6: I choose high decision number because my earning points will not be
affected;
• Statement7: I did not understand well, so I choose randomly.
The wording in the instructions is neutral-framed without referral to tax, capital, or
competition. I use “productive resources” to indicate capital. Subjects were asked to
choose a “decision number” instead of the tax rate. In addition, the word “competition” is
not mentioned at all in the instructions. I used neutral wording to prevent subjects’
pre-experiment perceptions on tax or competition or capital from contaminating the
experiments’ results. The results of this experiment can be applied to other scenarios with
similar game characteristics. The instructions for the experiment are included in the
Appendix.
2.5 Results
I report the results of the experiments in the following order. First, I examine the
effect of group size on tax choices. To answer this question, I compare the 2-Region Low
Sensitivity with the 3-Region Low Sensitivity treatments and compare the 2-Region High
Sensitivity with the 3-Region High Sensitivity treatments. Second, I explore the effect of
the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rate change keeping the group size constant. I
compare the 2-Region Low Sensitivity with the 2-Region High Sensitivity and the Race to
the Bottom treatments. 3-Region Low Sensitivity and 3-Region High Sensitivity
treatments are also analyzed. Finally, I consider the policy interventions.
2.5.1 The Effect of Group Size
One of the most interesting results is the statistically significant and large effect of
group size. As shown in Section 2, when the sensitivity of capital movement to tax rate is
fixed, the number of competing regions should not affect equilibrium tax rates. Hence, the
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theory predicts that we would observe the same tax rates in the 2-Region Low Sensitivity
and 3-Region Low Sensitivity treatments, and also same tax rates in the 2-Region High
Sensitivity and 3-Region High Sensitivity treatments. Table 2.2 presents the average
observed tax rates and predicted tax rates for the four treatments. The first column shows
the Nash equilibrium predicted tax rates. The following columns display the average tax
rates in all periods, period 1, period 1 to 5, period 6 to 10, and period 11 to 15. Fig. 2.3
depicts the evolution of the tax choices as subjects gain more experience with the game.
The dashed line represents the model prediction, while the data observed in the
experiments are marked as the circles and stars. Fig. 2.4 presents histograms of tax choices
in the last 5 period in the four treatments. I also regress tax choices on the competing
group size using the data from treatments 1-4 (2-Region and 3-Region Low/High
Sensitivity treatments). The results of the random effect regression model controlling for
period fixed effects can be found in the column (1) of Table 2.3.
Table 2.2: Predicted and Observed Tax Rates (%)
Treatments Nash Equilibrium
Average Tax Rates (st err) in Different Periods
All periods 1 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15
2-Region Low Sensitivity 16.15 19.29 28.56 22.29 18.48 17.11
(0.28) (1.28) (0.53) (0.46) (0.43)
3-Region Low Sensitivity 16.15 15.90 21.70 17.50 15.15 15.06
(0.20) (1.23) (0.41) (0.24) (0.35)
2-Region High Sensitivity 12.8 18.10 27.74 20.46 17.78 16.07
(0.30) (1.27) (0.54) (0.54) (0.48)
3-Region High Sensitivity 12.8 15.24 21.29 16.99 14.33 14.41
(0.32) (1.59) (0.61) (0.50) (0.56)
When the number of competing regions increase from 2 to 3, the observed tax rates
decrease substantially even though the Nash equilibrium prediction stays fixed. In the low
sensitivity treatments, an increase in the number of competing regions reduces the
all-period average tax rates from 19.29% to 15.9%, a decrease of 3.39%. The null
77
Figure 2.3: Dynamics of Tax Rates over Periods Comparing Different Group Size
hypothesis that tax choices are the same given the sensitivity of capital is rejected
(Mann-Whitney, z = 4.550, p < 0.01). Similar results are found in high sensitivity
treatments (Mann-Whitney, z = 4.653, p < 0.01). Presented in Table 2.3, the coefficients
on Group Size are statistically significant in all 3 regressions. Increasing the group size
from 2 to 3 reduces the tax rates by around 2.6%. The histograms in Fig. 2.4 show that
when group size is 2, the distribution of tax choices is more spread out than the
distributions when group size is 3. And some subjects did pick the optimum tax rate, 50%,
even in the presence of tax competition. The dynamics of tax rates choices also show that
there is a decreasing trend over the periods, and the standard error also tends to get
smaller as the experiment proceeds. The results reveal that subjects adjust behaviors to
converge to equilibrium as they are more experienced.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the observed tax rates are lower than Pareto-efficient
tax rates. While the observed tax rates are not consistent with the model predictions.
Except for the 3-Region Low Sensitivity treatment, the average tax rates in the other three
treatments are statistically significantly higher than the theoretical predictions. The
p-values of the three t-tests are 0.000. When we use the data of the last 5 periods, i.e.,
period 11 to 15, the results are equivalent. The p-values of t-tests using last the 5 periods
in the three treatments are 0.013, 0.000, and 0.000, respectively. In the 3-Region Low
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Figure 2.4: Histograms of Tax Choices in the Last Five Periods
Sensitivity treatment, the observed tax rates are consistently lower than the model
prediction in the last 8 periods. This means that when group size increases, the inefficiency
and under-provision of public goods are underestimated in theoretical tax competition
literature.
Conclusion 1: Consistent with Hypothesis 1, observed tax rates are lower than the
efficient tax rate, which demonstrates the inefficiency caused by tax competition.
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, tax rates are significantly lower when the group size
increases and sensitivity to capital movement stays fixed. The direct effect of group size is
underestimated in the theoretical literature, which is one main reason why the observed
behaviors are not consistent with the Nash equilibrium predictions.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Group Size and Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
Observed Tax Rates
Group Size -2.638*** -2.640*** -2.668***
(0.299) (0.300) (0.302)
Sensitivity -0.167 -0.057***
(0.296) (0.004)
Constant 26.861*** 27.427*** 27.042***
(1.102) (1.562) (0.901)
Period Dummies YES YES YES
# of subjects 253 253 277
# of observations 5190 5190 6030
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses * p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Random effects regression with clustering at the experimental session level. Column 1 and 2 show the
results of using data of Treatments 1-4. Column 3 shows the results of using data of Treatments 1-4 and
Race to the Bottom treatment.
This raises the question, why group size have such significant effect on tax choices.
One potential reason is that besides personal payoff, region also cares about attracting for
more capital, i.e., “winning” the game. Increasing group size make the competition more
fierce, and lower tax rates are needed to achieve the goal of more capital and winning. To
explore this explanation, I add regions’ previous period capital resources rank to the
regression. The rank variable is larger for regions that earn relatively more capital
resources. For regions that received the least amount of resources, the rank variable is 0.
For regions that received the most amount of resources compared with other competitors in
the previous period, the rank variable is 1 if the group size is two, and the rank is 2 if the
group size is three. I also include the variables regarding tax decision motive statements
asked in the questionnaire. For the seven Statement variables added to the regression,
higher values mean that subjects agree more with the motive statements. Results are
presented in Table 2.48.
8Statement1: I choose the decision number low so that the number of resources will relatively large;
Statement2: I Concentrated more on getting more resources than earning of points; Statement3: I choose
the decision number to get more resources than the other group member; Statement4: I choose the decision
number to earn more than the other group member; Statement5: I increase decision number to increase the
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Previous Resources Rank and Competition
Motives
(1) (2)
Observed Tax Rates
Previous Rank 0.315* 0.349**
(0.172) 0.165)
Group Size -2.729*** -2.793***
(0.424) (0.430)
Sensitivity -0.326 -0.142
(0.444) (0.461)
Statement 1 -1.006**
(0.511)
Statement 2 -0.324
(0.748)
Statement 3 -2.249***
(0.684)
Statement 4 0.354
(0.575)
Statement 5 0.840**
(0.349)
Statement 6 -0.221
(0.674)
Statement 7 0.286
(0.790)
Constant 28.784*** 30.774***
(1.837) (3.720)
Demographic Variables NO YES
Period Dummies YES YES
# of subjects 253 253
# of observations 4434 4434
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses * p < 0.10, ∗∗p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Random effects regression with clustering at the experimental
session level. Column 1 and 2 show the results of using data of Treatments 1-4.
Variable “Previous Rank” measures regions’ previous period capital resources rank
in the group. The rank variable is larger for region who earn relatively more capital
resources. The seven statement variables corresponds to seven motive statements
asked in the questionnaire. Higher variable values represent that subjects more
agree with the statement.
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Table 2.4 shows that the resource rank in the previous period has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the tax choices in current period. Regions tend to reduce
tax rates to attract more capital resources when their resource rank is low in the previous
previous period. Regions adjust their tax choices based on capital resources rank. The
second column of Table 2.4 shows that subjects’ motives for making tax decisions, many
have statistically significant effect. In particular, the effect of variable Statement 3, “I
choose the decision number to get more resources than the other group member”, is pretty
large. Subjects who have stronger motives of getting more resources than the competitors
tend to choose lower tax rates. When they face more competitors and larger group size,
they choose even lower tax rates to achieve the aim of more resources and winning the
game.
Another potential explanation for the significant effect of group size is that subjects
may learn the strategies from competitors more quickly when the group size is larger.
Thus, they are able to reach the equilibrium tax rates faster. I explore this explanation by
using only the data from last 5 and 2 periods to estimate the effect of group size. The
results are presented in Table 2.5.
Only using the last 2 periods of data to estimate the regressions, we also find a
statistically significant effect of group size on tax decisions. In the last a few periods, the
scale of effect is smaller, which may reflect that subjects learn and reach their equilibrium
strategies more quickly in larger group. Learning can only partly explain the behavior
divergence.
One might also think that risk aversion helps to explain the tax choices difference in
different group size. Table 2.6 presents the results of estimating the effect of risk
preferences. Risk Pref. is the risk preference variable measured by frequency of choosing
risky options in the lotteries. Lower values of this variable means more risk averse. Table
2.6 shows that risk averse subjects tend to choose lower tax rates. However, in two of
payment to the other group member; Statement6: I choose high decision number because my earning points
will not be affected; Statement7: I did not understand well, so I choose randomly.
82
Table 2.5: The Effect of Group Size Using Data from Last 5 and 2
Periods
(1) (2)
Observed Tax Rates
Group Size -1.268*** -0.849*
(0.399) (0.468)
Sensitivity -0.587 -0.369
(0.507) (0.575)
Constant 19.149*** 17.554***
(1.543) (1.703)
Period Dummies YES YES
# of subjects 253 253
# of observations 1730 692
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses * p <
0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Random effects regression with clustering at
the experimental session level. Column 1 and 2 show the results of using last 5 and
2 periods data of Treatments 1-4 respectively.
regressions, the coefficients on risk preference are not statistically significant.
Distributional Pref. is measured by percentage of tokens that are saved for self. Higher
values of this variable represents being more selfish. Table 2.6 shows that more selfish
subjects tend to choose lower tax rates. However, similar to the effect of risk preferences,
distributional preferences do not have significant effect on tax choices.
2.5.2 The Effect of the Sensitivity of Capital Movement
We have seen that increasing group size has a significant impact on tax rates. In this
section, I investigate the effect of the sensitivity of capital movement. The hypothesis is
that the more sensitive capital movement is to tax rate, the lower the equilibrium tax rate
is, everything else holds fixed. Hence, compared to 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment, we
expect to observe lower tax rates in the 2-Region High Sensitivity treatment and much
lower rate in the Race to the bottom treatment. We also expect that the tax rates in the
3-Region High Sensitivity will be lower than the rates in the 3-Region Low Sensitivity.
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Risk and Distributional Preferences
(1) (2) (3)
Observed Tax Rates
Group Size -2.616*** -2.641*** -2.675***
(0.339) (0.338) (0.355)
Sensitivity -0.18 -0.083 -0.056***
(0.629) (0.619) (0.005)
Risk Pref. 0.477 0.543* 0.38
(0.319) (0.314) (0.327)
Distributional Pref. -2.947 -0.541 -1.403
(2.455) (3.296) (3.287)
Statement1 -0.946** -0.321
(0.477) (0.504)
Statement2 -0.33 -0.739
(0.583) (0.584)
Statement3 -2.414*** -2.421***
(0.612) (0.651)
Statement4 0.439 -0.047
(0.667) (0.695)
Statement5 0.638 0.694
(0.595) (0.599)
Statement6 -0.208 -0.426
(0.642) (0.668)
Statement7 0.244 -0.259
(0.677) (0.725)
Male 1.555 0.882
(1.182) (1.205)
School Year 0.221 0.223
(0.529) (0.546)
GPA -1.914** -1.752**
(0.783) (0.815)
Smoke 0.239 -1.137
(1.985) (2.17)
Self-rated Ranking -1.471** -1.182
(0.715) (0.734)
Understanding 0.92 1.680**
(0.658) (0.693)
Constant 27.721*** 28.413*** 25.365***
(3.298) (4.69) (4.254)
Period Dummies YES YES YES
# of subjects 253 253 277
# of observations 5190 5190 6030
Notes: Risk Pref. is the risk preference variable measured by frequency of choosing risky options in
the lotteries. Lower values of this variable means more risk averse. Distributional Pref. is measured by
percentage of tokens that are saved for self. Higher values of this variable represents being more selfish.
Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses * p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Random effects regression with clustering at the experimental session level. Column 1 and 2 show
the results of using data of Treatments 1-4. Column 3 shows the results of using data of Treatment
1-5.
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Table 2.7 presents summary statistics of observed tax rates and predicted tax rates in
the five treatments. Fig. 2.5 depicts the trend of tax rates over time for the five
treatments. The results are consistent with the null hypothesis that tax rates are lower in
treatments with higher sensitivity. In the 2-Region treatments, an increase in the
sensitivity reduces the all-period average tax rates from 19.29% to 18.10%, a decrease of
1.19%. Mann-Whitney tests reject that tax rates in 2-Region Low Sensitivity and 2-Region
High Sensitivity treatment are the same (z = 2.775, p < 0.01). Similar results can be found
when there are 3 regions in the group (z = 7.368, p < 0.01). Although the negative effect of
sensitivity on tax rates goes in the direction predicted by theory, the scale of the effect is
well below theoretical predictions. Regressing tax rates on capital movement sensitivity
and group size, we find that the effect of sensitivity is not statistically significant (see
results in Column 2 of Table 2.3). One potential reason for the insignificant effects is that
the sensitivity difference between High Sensitivity and Low Sensitivity treatments is not
large enough to induce behavior distinctions. The results of including Race to the Bottom
data in the regression is presented in Column 3 of Table 2.3. The effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level; however, the scale of the effect is much smaller than predictions.
Table 2.7: Predicted and Observed Tax Rates with Race to the Bottom Treatment(%)
Treatments
Predicted Average Tax Rates (st err) in Different Periods
Taxes All periods 1 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15
2-Region Low Sensitivity 16.15 19.29 28.56 22.29 18.48 17.11
(0.28) (1.28) (0.53) (0.46) (0.43)
2-Region High Sensitivity 12.8 18.10 27.74 20.46 17.78 16.07
(0.30) (1.27) (0.54) (0.54) (0.48)
Race to the bottom 1 13.90 19.70 15.64 13.55 12.52
(0.55) (2.08) (0.90) (0.95) (0.98)
3-Region Low Sensitivity 16.15 15.90 21.70 17.50 15.15 15.06
(0.20) (1.23) (0.41) (0.24) (0.35)
3-Region High Sensitivity 12.8 15.24 21.29 16.99 14.33 14.41
(0.32) (1.59) (0.61) (0.50) (0.56)
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Figure 2.5: Dynamics of Tax Rates over Periods Comparing Different Sensitivity
Conclusion 2: The effect of the sensitivity of capital movement is statistically
significant in some regressions, but the scale of effect is much smaller than predictions.
2.5.3 Response Function
The above shows that the effects of group size and sensitivity diverge from the model
predictions. These divergences raise one question regarding behaviors, whether these
behaviors are caused by subjects’ confusion and indiscretion or whether they reflect some
phenomenon that has been neglected in the literature. To answer the question, this section
examines whether subjects behave strategically.
I estimate how subjects respond to the competitor’s tax choices and confront the
response with model predictions. As shown in section 2, the predicted response function for
Low Sensitivity treatments is t1 =
t2
4
−
√
100t22−20t2+201
40
− 19
40
if t2 < 0.6596. The function is
close to a line with the slope as around 0.21. In a given round, subjects choose tax rates
simultaneously and can not observe the competitor’s tax choice. They need to predict
competitor’s behavior and respond correspondingly. To measure the prediction on the
other group member’s behaviors, I use the previous round tax rates of the other group
member and construct the variable “Prediction”. In 3-Region treatments, “Prediction” is
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constructed by using the average of the other two group members’ tax rates in the pervious
round . The effect of the variable “Prediction” reflects how subjects react to others’ tax
choices, thus the subjects’ response function. Table 2.8 presents the estimated response
function results using random effect regressions. In Column 2 of Table 2.8, the interaction
term of prediction and sensitivity is added to the regression, which measures how the
response may changes with different sensitivity of capital movement.
The results show that subjects do positively respond to others’ predicted tax rates as
predicted. When subjects project that others’ tax rate will reduce by 1%, they decrease
their own tax rates by around 0.3% in response. The scale of the effect is a little bit larger
than suggested by predictions as noted above (0.21). The sensitivity does not statistically
significantly move the reaction function, which is consistent with the limited effect of
sensitivity found in Tables 2.3 and 2.7.
Table 2.8: Estimating the Response Function
(1) (2)
Observed Tax Rates
Prediction 0.341*** 0.317***
(0.041) (0.026)
Prediction * Sensitivity 0.053
(0.077)
Group Size -1.626*** -1.653***
(0.221) (0.243)
Sensitivity -0.253 -1.150
(0.377) (1.131)
Constant 11.038*** 14.127***
(1.837) (3.720)
Period Dummies YES YES
# of subjects 253 253
# of observations 5190 5190
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses * p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Random effects regression with clustering at the experimental session
level. Column 1 and 2 show the results of using data of Treatments 1-4. Variable “Predic-
tion” measures how subjects predict the competitor’s behaviors, and I use the competitor’s
pervious round behaviors to construct it.
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Conclusion 3: subjects behave strategically and respond to competitor’s behaviors in
the same direction as predicted.
2.5.4 The Effect of Policy intervention
Considering the inefficiency caused by tax competition, proper policy interventions are
needed to improve tax choices. I consider two potential policy interventions, minimum tax
rate constraint, and communication. Table 2.9 shows the results of tax rates with and
without policy interventions. Fig. 2.6 and Fig. 2.7 show the evolution of tax choices over
periods. Fig. 2.8 compares the histograms of tax choices in last five periods. Both policy
interventions significantly increase tax rates (Mann-Whitney tests comparing minimum
constraint treatment and 2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment are z = 21.682, p < 0.01;
Mann-Whitney tests comparing communication treatment treatment and 2-Region Low
Sensitivity treatment are z = 19.505, p < 0.01.)
When we set the minimum tax rate constraint to be 30%, observed average tax rate is
34.03%. Most of the tax rate choices, around 63.6 percent, are close to the constraint level
(30% or 31%). This policy instrument does have an effect on increasing the tax rates and
reducing inefficiency, though the impact is mainly caused by the binding constraint.
Table 2.9: Predicted and Observed Tax Rates in Policy Intervention treatments
Treatments Prediction
Average tax rates (st err) in different periods
All periods 1 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15
Minimum Constraint 30 34.03 39.36 35.86 33.43 32.78
(0.36) (1.73) (0.65) (0.60) (0.59)
2-Region Communication 16.15 44.48 46.45 45.27 43.07 45.09
(0.98) (3.31) (1.73) (1.73) (1.62)
3-Region Communication 16.15 34.80 38.33 37.42 34.86 32.13
(1.13) (4.93) (2.04) (1.89) (1.93)
2-Region Low Sensitivity 16.15 19.29 28.56 22.29 18.48 17.11
(0.28) (1.28) (0.53) (0.46) (0.43)
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On the other hand, communication is able to improve the tax rates substantially, even
without the binding constraint. The average tax rate in 2-Region Communication
treatment is 44.48%, which is close to the optimal tax rate, 50%. This substantial effect
also lasts through the 15 periods, and in the last few periods, the tax rates are even getting
higher. Around 58.8% of tax choices are optimal tax rates, compared to only 4.6% in the
2-Region Low Sensitivity treatment.
The effect of communication can also be found when the group size is 3. The average
tax rate is 34.80%. This rate is substantially higher than the treatment without
communication. Compared to the case of group size to be 2, the average tax rate is lower.
Fig. 2.8 presents the histograms of tax rates in the 2-Region and 3-Region treatments.
There are substantially fewer regions choosing optimal tax rates when group size is 3
(26.3%). This is likely the results of larger group size increasing the difficulty of forming an
agreement when there is no punishment.
Figure 2.6: Dynamics of Tax Rates over Periods Comparing Policy Interventions
Conclusion 4: Minimum tax constraint increases tax rates mainly through their
compulsion to increasing tax rates to the binding minimum tax rates. Communication
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Figure 2.7: Dynamics of Tax Rates over Periods Comparing Policy Interventions in 3-Region
treatments
significantly increases tax rates and social welfare by promoting cooperative policies and
adopting efficient tax rates among competing regions. The cooperation becomes harder to
form with more competing regions.
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Figure 2.8: Histograms of Tax Choices in the Last Five Periods Comparing Different Policy
Interventions
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This essay uses a controlled laboratory experiment to study the effect of tax
competition. I design several experimental treatments to test the predictions of different
tax competition models. The treatments vary across the following dimensions: the number
of competing regions, the elasticity of capital movement to the tax rate. I also explore the
effects of two policy instruments that could mitigate the potential inefficiency, namely
minimum tax rate constraint and communication. Results show that the effect of several
factors is not consistent with the model predictions even though regions behave
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strategically. Particularly, the direct impact of the number of competing regions on tax
rates has been overlooked in the tax competition model and literature.
This paper is a first attempt of using an experimental method to test tax competition
model predictions. Many features that are present in the tax competition are not
considered in the experiment. Other interesting predictions and phenomena in the
literature call for further investigations and studies in the future. The competition game
and the social dilemma presented in this paper may prove interesting to be further
explored in experimental works.
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2.7 Appendices
I provide an example of the experiment instruction of 2-Region Low Sensitivity
treatment.
Welcome!
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision-making. Please read these
instructions carefully, as the money you earn may depend on how well you understand
them.
No Talking Allowed
Please DO NOT talk to other participants. If you have any questions after you finish
reading the instructions, please raise your hand, the experimenter will approach you and
answer your question in private.
Turn Off Personal Electronics
Please take a minute and turn off all of your electronic devices, especially phones.
Anonymity
Your decisions will be completely anonymous to other participants. No participant will
be able to link your choices to your identity.
Decision Tasks
The experiment includes 4 parts. Before the beginning of each part, we will explain
the decision tasks about that part and the computer screen.
Payment
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All earnings are denominated in this
currency. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid. The tokens you earn in the
experiment will be converted into dollars using the exchange rate: 300 Tokens = $1. One
round in every part will be randomly selected at the end of the each part, and your earning
in the selected rounds will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
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2.7.1 Practice
Before the experiment, you have 3 practice rounds. These rounds are for practice to
let you have a better understanding of the experiment. These 3 practice rounds will NOT
be paid.
At the beginning of each round, you will be given a certain amount of “productive
resources”. Your task for each round is to split the productive resources into two
accounts, Account x and Account y. Your earning in this round is determined by
multiplying resources in Account x by resources in Account y:
Your Earning = Resources in Account x times Resources in Account y
For example, if you have 40 resources in Account x and 80 resources in Account y,
then your earning is 40 ∗ 80 = 3200 Tokens.
To split the resources, you need to choose a “decision number” between 0 and 80.
Your decision number is the percentage of the productive resources you decide to put into
Account x. For example, if your decision number is 40%, you will put 40% of the total
resources into Account x, and the rest of the resources (60%) will be automatically
allocated to Account y.
Example:
Suppose you are given 120 resources, and you choose 40% as the decision number.
This means that you put 48(48 = 120 ∗ 40%) resources into Account x. And the rest of
resources 72(72 = 120− 48) are automatically put into Account y. So, your earning is
48 ∗ 72 = 3456 Tokens.
Calculator
To assist in your decision, a built-in calculator on the computer screen is provided. See
the computer screen image below. At the top of the screen, there is a slider with an orange
box. By dragging the orange box on the slider to different decision numbers, you can see
the amount of resources that are allocated to the two accounts and your earning for a given
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decision number. The decision number is shown above the slider. Below the slider, on the
left, you can find the resources that would be allocated to the two accounts and your
earning. Your total amount of resources is shown by the orange text. The green line is all
the possible allocations of the resources into the two accounts. When you slide the decision
number on the slider, the green box will change accordingly. The width of the green box is
the amount of resources in Account x. The height of the green box is the amount of
resources in Account y. The size of the box is the earning you will get. For example, the
computer interface below is an example for which the total amount of resources is 120.
When you drag the orange box to 40 and pick the decision number to be 40, you will
allocate 40% (48) resources into Account x. As you can see, the width of the green box is
48. The rest of resources, 72, will be allocated in Account y. The height of the green box is
72. The size the box is 3456 Tokens. Once you made your decision, enter your decision
number on the right lower box and press the “Submit your decision” button.
Time Limit
For each round, you have 1 minute (60 seconds) to choose the decision number. If you
run out of the time and did not submit decision, your earning will be 0 in this round.
2.7.2 2-Region Low Sensitivity Treatment
This part of the experiment consists of 15 identical rounds. One round will be
randomly selected at the end of the experiment, and your earning in this selected round
will be paid to you. As in the practice rounds, your task for each round is to choose a
decision number to split the productive resources. The difference is that your amount
of productive resources is not fixed. It depends on your decision number and
the decision number of the other participant in your group.
Fixed Matching and Anonymity
At the beginning of this part of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with
one other participant in the room to form a group of two. The group remain fixed for all 15
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Figure 2.9: Practice Part Computer Screen
rounds in this part. No one will learn the identity of the other participant in your group.
Your decisions will be completely anonymous to other participants. No participant will be
able to link your choices to your identity.
Amount of productive resources
You originally have 120 productive resources at the beginning of each round. The
productive resources are mobile in the group. Both your decision number and the other
group member’s decision number will affect the final amount of your productive resources.
The lower your decision number is, the more resources you are able to attract.
To be more specific, suppose you choose the same decision number as the other group
member, then the resources will not be reallocated. Both you and the other group member
will have 120 productive resources in the end. For every 1 point higher your decision
number is than the other group member’s, your productive resource will fall by 3 from 120.
For every 1 point lower your decision number is than the other group member’s, your
productive resource will increase by 3 from 120. The following table gives two examples:
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Table 2.10: Two Examples
Your
decision
number
The
other
group
mem-
ber’s
decision
number
Decision
number
difference
Your amount
of productive
resources
The other’s
amount of
productive
resources
Example 1 20% 24% 24− 20 = 4 120 + 3 ∗ 4 =
132
120− 3 ∗ 4 =
108
Example 2 30% 20% 20− 30 =
−10
120 + 3 ∗
(−10) = 90
120 + 3 ∗ 10 =
150
Steps for each round:
• At the beginning of each round, you and the other group member choose decision
number simultaneously and privately.
• Then, your final amount of productive resources will be determined.
• Then, your resources in Account x and Account y will be calculated.
• At the end, your earning (resources in Account x x resources in Account y) will be
calculated and shown on the screen. You will also see the other group member’s
decision number and earning on the screen.
The Calculator
A built-in calculator on the computer screen is provided. At the top of the screen,
there are two sliders. You can pick your guess decision number by dragging the orange box
on the top slider. You can also pick the other group member’s hypothetical decision
number by dragging the black box on the second slider. The black text above the slider
will show the other group member’s decision number you choose. Notice that these
decision number you picked are hypothetical decisions, and the real decision numbers
could be different. You cannot decide other’s decision number.
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As in the practice rounds, below the slider, the green line shows all the possible
allocations of the resources into the two accounts. The green box shows your earning.
For example, the below computer interface shows when you choose the decision
number to 30 and the other choose the decision number to be 20. Then your amount of
resources is 90. Since your decision number is 30, you allocate 30% of the resources into
Account x, which is 90 ∗ 30% = 27. The rest of the resources, 90− 27 = 63, will be
allocated to Account y. So your earning is 27 ∗ 63 = 1701.
Time Limit
For each round, you have 2 minutes (120 seconds) to choose the decision number.
Once you made your decision, enter your decision number on the right lower box and press
the “Submit your decision” button.
Figure 2.10: Part 1 Computer Screen
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2.7.3 Questionnaire
1. What is your class standing?
• Freshman
• Sophomore
• Junior
• Senior
2. What is your intended or declared major?
3. On a 4-point scale, what is your current GPA?
• Between 3.75 and 4.0 GPA (mostly A’s)
• Between 3.25 and 3.74 GPA (about half A’s and half B’s)
• Between 2.75 and 3.24 GPA (mostly B’s)
• Between 2.25 and 2.74 GPA (about half B’s and half C’s)
• Between 1.75 and 2.24 GPA (mostly C’s)
• Other
4. In what year were you born?
5. What is your gender?
6. What is your race?
7. How / would you characterize your religious beliefs? Please check the one / that
best represents them.
• Atheism
• Buddhism
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• Christianity – Baptist
• Christianity – Catholic
• Christianity - Methodist
• Christianity - Other
• Hinduism
• Islam
• Judaism
• Nonreligious or Agnostic
• Other
• Prefer not to answer
Do you agree with the following statement? (Strongly disagree, disagree, not sure,
agree, strongly agree)
• Statement 1. I choose the decision number low so that the number of resources will
relatively large.
• Statement 2. I Concentrated more on getting more resources than earning of points.
• Statement 3. I choose the decision number to get more resources than the other
group member.
• Statement 4. I choose the decision number to earn more than the other group
member.
• Statement 5. I increase decision number to increase the payment to the other group
member.
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• Statement 6. I choose high decision number because my earning points will not be
affected.
• Statement 7. I did not understand well, so I choose randomly.
15. How did you feel about the 120s time limit?
• Too short
• Short
• Appropriate
• Long
• Too long
16. How would you rank your total earnings among all the participants?
• Top 5
• Top 25
• Average
• Bottom 25
• Lowest 5
17. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate your understanding of the
INFORMATION presented in the experiment?
18. Were there any problems you ran into during the course of the experiment? If
there were problems, please write a brief explanation below.
19. Was there anything that could have been made clearer to help you make tax rate
decisions? If something could have been made clearer, please write a brief explanation
below
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Essay 3
Multi Prizes for Multi Tasks: Externalities and the Op-
timal Design of Tournaments
3.1 Introduction
In the principal-agent problem, the principal needs to use certain mechanisms to
induce the optimal effort levels from the agents. The design of incentive schemes is an
important issue to explore. Tournament is such a scheme(Lazear and Rosen, 1981). A
tournament involves several agents with each undertaking one task to produce a single
product. It awards the participating agents on the basis of the ordinal ranking of their
performances. In equilibrium, the effort levels that agent make are optimal. The optimum
property with agents performing one task and producing one output can also be preserved
when the model is extended to the setting in which agents undertake multiple tasks and
produce multiple outputs (see, for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Barlevy and
Neal, 2012; Liu and Xu, 2018).
In the tournament settings discussed above, there are no inter-agent externalities in
which an agent’s actions may affect the performances of other competing agents, nor are
there effects of one task’s performance on other tasks’ performances of the same agent. It
has been noted that, in many situations, there are various externalities in the performances
of competing agents. These externalities can take various forms. For example, agents may
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engage in sabotage activities to increase the probability of winning by reducing their
opponents’ measured output (Lazear, 1989), or an agent may help co-workers ‘as with
on-the-job training of junior by senior employees’ (Drago and Garvey, 1998), or due to
team externalities, greater efforts by one agent increase another agent’s output (Drago and
Turnbull, 1988). In multi-task environments, in some cases, an agent’s effort on one task
may affect the performance of this agent as well as other agents on other tasks. One
example is the research management problem (Bardsley,1999). Agents (scientist) allocate
effort and resources among multiple tasks (a portfolio of projects), and the principal (the
central research manager) uses the allocation of funds as the incentive to achieve policy
objectives. Scientists engage in a tournament to get funds. Some projects may have
external effects on other projects due to the spillover of scientific knowledge. Political
competition and election is another example. Voters, as the principal, elect the ‘best’
candidate for the office or position. Political candidates are agents and perform multiple
tasks to get elected. The externalities across tasks and across candidates may exist, e.g.,
the introduction of a refinery factory promotes local economic development, but may
damage the local environment and the environment of the neighboring districts.
In the literature on tournaments with a single task and a single output, it has been
shown that, in the presence of inter-agent externalities, tournaments often fail to achieve
their intended goals (see Lazear, 1989, Drago and Turnbull, 1988, for some early
contributions, and Chowdhury and Guertler, 2015, and Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, and
Gangloff, 2014 for surveys on the related contributions). On the other hand, there seems
no study in the literature that explores tournaments with multi tasks and multi outputs in
the presence of inter-agent externalities. This paper tries to fill this gap and studies
tournaments in which there are inter-agent externalities.
In our set-up, each agent has two tasks to undertake, and one of the tasks produce
inter-agent externalities. It has effect on the performances of the other task of the self
agent and the competing agents as well. We examine the problem of designing
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tournaments to induce the optimal effort levels from the agents, and show that, in the
presence of inter-agent externalities, there is no single-prized tournament that can be used
to elicit the optimal effort levels. We thus propose the task-specific, multi-prized
tournaments, which can accomplish the intended goal in this case. In our design, for each
task, agents are ranked according to their performances along this task, and task-specific
prizes are awarded to the agents based on their performances on each task. Each agent
receive multiple prizes from multiple tasks. Through adjusting the spread of the prizes for
different tasks, optimal effort levels from the agent can be induced. The intuition that
task-specific multi-prized tournaments can induce optimal effort levels may be explained as
follows. In a tournament with multiple tasks, competing agents exert effort to increase the
rank of their performances and balance the efforts among different tasks. If a task has
spillover effects on the performance of other competing agents, the incentive of
tournaments is distorted due to that agents do not internalize such externalities. To
increase performance rank, an agent tends to put too much (or too little) efforts on tasks
that have negative (or positive) externalities on other agents to reduce their measured
output. The task-specific, multi-prized tournaments can resolve this distortion by adjusting
the prizes for different tasks. A low (high) winning prize for a task with negative
externalities reduces (increases) the agents’ efforts and adjust efforts levels to the optimum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce and set
up our model. Section 2 discusses the design of the tournaments and presents our main
results. Section 3 contains a few concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The setup
In this section, we present our basic model. Consider two competing agents, 1 and 2,
in a tournament. The agents choose their efforts for two tasks: a task with externality, to
104
be called e, and a task without externality, to be called t. For each agent i ∈ {1, 2}, let ei
and ti be the effort levels i spends on e and on t, respectively. Agent i’s (i ∈ {1, 2})
‘production functions’ are assumed to take the following forms:
Ei = ei + i (3.2.1)
Ti = αti + βei + β
′ej + ξi (3.2.2)
where Ei and Ti, respectively, measure agent i’s performance on e and t. α(> 0), β and β
′
are given parameters. 1, 2, ξ1 and ξ2 are random variables with zero means and are
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
It may be remarked that, in the above production functions, the parameter β captures
the effect incurred by an agent’s effort in task e on the performance of the same agent’s
task t. β′ captures the inter-agent externality and represents externalities imposed by an
agent’s effort in task e on the other agent’s performance of task t.
For each agent i ∈ {1, 2}, let C(ei, ti) be the cost function when i exerts effort levels ei
and ti. We assume that the cost function is the same for both agents. The cost function
C(·, ·) is assumed to be strictly increasing in each of its arguments, strictly convex,
C(0, 0) = 0, Cei(0, a) = Cti(b, 0) = 0 for all a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and lima→∞Cei(a, ti)→∞ for all
ti > 0 and limb→∞Cti(ei, b)→∞ for all ei > 0.
3.2.2 Optimal choices of effort levels
We first consider socially optimal choices of effort levels by the agents. For this
purpose, we consider the principal’s problem where the principal chooses agents’ effort
levels to maximize the expected value of a simple sum of outputs net the costs of exerting
such efforts:
max
e1,e2,t1,t2
E[E1 + T1 + E2 + T2 − C(e1, t1)− C(e2, t2)] (3.2.3)
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Substituting the outputs and taking the expectation, we have
max
e1,e2,t1,t2
(1 + β + β′)(e1 + e2) + α(t1 + t2)− C(e1, t1)− C(e2, t2) (3.2.4)
Let e∗1, e
∗
2, t
∗
1 and t
∗
2 be the solutions to the above problem. Then, noting that the
objective function of problem (3.2.4) is strictly concave in ei and ti, the following first order
conditions are both necessary and sufficient for i = 1, 2:
(1 + β + β′)− Cei(e∗i , t∗i ) ≤ 0 (= 0 if e∗i > 0)
α− Cti(e∗i , t∗i ) ≤ 0 (= 0 if t∗i > 0)
It may be noted that, if (1 + β + β′) ≤ 0, then e∗1 = 0 = e∗2. That is, the optimal
choices of effort levels for task e are 0 for the agents. The intuition is fairly straightforward:
when externalities inflicted on task t in performing task e by the agents are destructive and
large (so that β + β′ ≤ −1), it is optimal for the principal to ask the agents to perform just
one task, task t, which causes no externalities. In this case, the problem is reduced to the
conventional single task problem. In the subsequent discussions, therefore, we consider the
case in which 1 + β + β′ > 0.
Proposition 1. Let 1 + β + β′ > 0. Then, there exists a unique set of effort levels,
(e∗1, e
∗
2, t
∗
1, t
∗
2), to the problem (3.2.4) such that e
∗
1 > 0, e
∗
2 > 0, t
∗
1 > 0 and t
∗
2 > 0.
Proof. Let 1 + β + β′ > 0.
For each i = 1, 2, define a function h(ei, ti) = (1 + β + β
′)ei + αti − C(ei, ti). Since
C(ei, ti) is strictly convex, h(ei, ti) is strictly concave. Note that Cei(0, ti) = 0 for all ti ≥ 0,
Cti(ei, 0) = 0 for all ei ≥ 0, lima→∞Cei(a, ti)→∞ for all ti > 0 and limb→∞Cei(ei, b)→∞
for all ei > 0.
Let U = {u ∈ R2+ : u1 + u2 = 1}. Any vector (ei, ti) can be uniquely expressed as λu
for some λ ≥ 0 and some u ∈ U . Given our assumptions on C(ei, ti), for any given vector
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u ∈ U , it must be the case that C(λu) is increasing and convex in λ, and
limλ→∞Cλ(λu) =∞. Since (1 + β + β′)λei + αλti is concave in λ, for any u ∈ U , there
exists a finite cutoff value, λu, of λ such that h(ei, ti) evaluated at (ei, ti) = λu will be
negative for all λ ≥ λu. Let λ∗ = sup{λu : u ∈ U}. Since U is compact, λ∗ is well defined
and finite. It follows that the global maximum for h(ei, ti) lies in the bounded set [0, λ
∗]2.
Since the function h(ei, ti) is strictly concave, it is also strictly concave over [0, λ
∗]2,
which is the region that contains the global optimum. This ensures that the following
first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient a global maximum:
(1 + β + β′)− Cei(e∗i , t∗i ) ≤ 0(= 0 if e∗i > 0)
α− Cti(e∗i , t∗i ) ≤ 0(= 0 if t∗i > 0)
The boundary conditions on C and subsequently on h, together with the assumptions
that (1 + β + β′) > 0 and α > 0, ensure the maximum of h being achieved at an interior
point so that e∗i > 0 and t
∗
i > 0. Therefore, there exist e
∗
i > 0, t
∗
i > 0 (i = 1, 2) satisfying
the following equations:
(1 + β + β′)− Cei(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
α− Cti(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
These are necessary and sufficient conditions for the problem (3.2.4). Since h is
strictly concave, e∗i , t
∗
i (i = 1, 2) are unique.
Subsequently, we shall call (e∗1, t
∗
1, e
∗
2, t
∗
2) that solves the problem (3.2.4) as the ‘social
optimum’. Since the principal does not observe the agents’ choices of effort levels, we shall
introduce incentive schemes needed to induce the social optimum in the next section.
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3.3 Tournaments
In this section, we discuss the design of tournaments to achieve social optimum
characterized in the last section. Two different forms of tournament will be explored: a
single-prized tournament and a multi-prized tournament. In a single-prized tournament,
there is one tournament for both tasks combined and a single prize will be given to the
winner, while in a multi-prized tournament, there is a tournament for each task and a prize
will be given to the winner of each tournament.
3.3.1 Single-prized tournament
In this subsection, we discuss single-prized tournaments. A single-prized tournament
involves a bonus, to be denoted by B, and a base pay, to be denoted by B0. In our
discussion, we do not restrict B to be positive only. The bonus B is given to the agent who
has a bigger total output than the other agent where the total output is the simple sum of
the agent’s performances on the two tasks. We first discuss the design of B by the principal.
We model the two agents as playing a simultaneous move game. Agent i’s (i ∈ {1, 2})
objective is to solve the following maximization problem given the other agent’s choices:
max
ei,ti
B0 +BPr[Ei + Ti > Ej + Tj]− C(ei, ti) (3.3.1)
Note that
Ei + Ti > Ej + Tj ⇔ j + ξj − i − ξi < (1 + β − β′)(ei − ej) + α(ti − tj)
Then, the above optimization problem (3.3.1) can be rewritten as follows:
max
ei,ti
B0 +BPr[j + ξj − i − ξi < (1 + β − β′)(ei − ej) + α(ti − tj)]− C(ei, ti) (3.3.2)
108
Let G(·) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the random variable
i + ξi − j − ξj. Then the optimization problem for agent i (i ∈ {1, 2} is:
max
ei,ti
B0 +BG[(1 + β − β′)(ei − ej) + α(ti − tj)]− C(ei, ti) (3.3.3)
Let G(·) be differentiable with G′(·) = g(·). Agent i’s best responses to the competing
agent’s efforts can be characterized by the following first order conditions:
(1 + β − β′)Bg[(1 + β − β′)(ei − ej) + α(ti − tj)]− Cei(ei, ti) ≤ 0(= 0 if ei > 0)(3.3.4)
αBg[(1 + β − β′)(ei − ej) + α(ti − tj)]− Cti(ei, ti) ≤ 0(= 0 if ti > 0)(3.3.5)
Let ((es1, t
s
1), (e
s
2, t
s
2)) denote a Nash equilibrium pair of efforts chosen by the two agents.
Proposition 2. For each B, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium pair of efforts
which involves both agents choosing the same effort levels: es1 = e
s
2 ≥ 0, ts1 = ts2 ≥ 0 .
Proof. For a given B, a Nash equilibrium, ((es1, t
s
1), (e
s
2, e
s
2)), is a solution that solves the
agents’ best responses, (3.3.4), (3.3.5). Being symmetric, the solution is such that
es1 = e
s
2, t
s
1 = t
s
2 and satisfies
(1 + β − β′)Bg(0)− Ce1(e1, t1) ≤ 0(= 0 if e1 > 0) (3.3.6)
αBg(0)− Ct1(e1, t1) ≤ 0(= 0 if t1 > 0) (3.3.7)
When B = 0, from the above, es1 = e
s
2 = 0 and t
s
1 = t
s
2 = 0 solve the problem.
When B < 0, from equation (3.3.7), we have ts1 = 0. If (1 + β − β′) ≥ 0, then
(es1 = 0, t
s
1 = 0) satisfies (3.3.6) and (3.3.7). When 1 + β − β′ < 0, (3.3.6) becomes
(1 + β + β′)Bg(0)− Ce1(e1, 0) = 0
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Note that (1 + β + β′)Bg(0) > 0. Given the boundary conditions of C(e1, t2), there is
es1 > 0 satisfying the above condition. Hence, in this case, there exists a pair
(es1 > 0, t
s
1 = 0) satisfying (3.3.6) and (3.3.7).
Consider B > 0. Suppose first 1 + β − β′ > 0. Then, following a similar proof strategy
to that of Proposition 1, we can show that there exist es1 > 0, t
s
1 > 0 satisfying (3.3.6) and
(3.3.7). If 1 + β − β′ ≤ 0, then, from (3.3.6), es1 = 0. Given the conditions on C(e1, t1),
from (3.3.7), there exists ts1 ≥ 0 that satisfies (3.3.7).
Proposition 2 informs us the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. As we have
seen in the process of proving Proposition 2, the question whether a single-prized
tournament will be able to elicit optimal efforts from the agents lingers, and the answer to
this question may depend on the parameters β and β′. In the rest of this subsection, we
discuss whether a single-prized tournament can accomplish its intended goal of eliciting
optimal efforts from the agents.
Proposition 3. Let 1 + β + β′ > 0. If β′ = 0, then there exists a B > 0 such that the
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the single-prized tournament is the social optimum, e.g.,
(esi , t
s
i ) = (e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2.
Proof. When β′ = 0, 1 + β + β′ = 1 + β > 0. The first order conditions (3.3.6) and (3.3.7)
for an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium become: for each i = 1, 2,
(1 + β)Bg[0]− Cei(esi , tsi ) = 0
αBg[0]− Cti(esi , tsi ) = 0
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On the other hand, the social optimum, (e∗i , t
∗
i )(i = 1, 2), is characterized by the
following:
(1 + β)− Cei(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
α− Cti(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
By setting B = 1/g[0] and from the proof of Proposition 1 that the social optimum is
unique, we must have (esi , t
s
i ) = (e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3 stats that, if there is no cross-agent externality, a single-prized
tournament can achieve the social optimum. The optimum is obtained by the agents’
internalization of the cross-task externalies. However, when there are cross-agent
externalities, a single-prized tournament fails to induce social optimal efforts, as shown by
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let 1 + β + β′ > 0. If β′ 6= 0, then there exists no B such that the
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the single-prized tournament is the social optimum.
Proof. Let (1 + β + β′) > 0 and β′ 6= 0. We note that if there was a B such that
(esi , t
s
i ) = (e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2. Then, we would have
(1 + β − β′)Bg[0]− Cei(esi , tsi ) = 0
αBg[0]− Cti(esi , tsi ) = 0
and
(1 + β + β′)− Cei(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
α− Cti(e∗i , t∗i ) = 0
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From the above, we would then obtain
(1 + β + β′) = Cei(e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) = Cei(e
s
i , t
s
i ) = (1 + β − β′)Bg[0] (3.3.8)
α = Cti(e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) = Cti(e
s
i , t
s
i ) = αBg[0] (3.3.9)
(3.3.8) would imply
1 + β + β′ = (1 + β − β′)Bg[0]. (3.3.10)
and (3.3.9) would imply
1 = Bg[0] (3.3.11)
(3.3.10) and (3.3.11) would be in contradiction with β′ 6= 0. Therefore, there is no B such
that (esi , t
s
i ) = (e
∗
i , t
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2
When there are externalities across competing agents, i.e., when β′ 6= 0, a single-prized
tournament cannot achieve the social optimum. To understand the intuition behind this
result, we note that, in a single-prized tournament, the winning agent is the one who
produces the greatest ‘total output’, the total output being the simple sum of the
performances of the two tasks. In the production functions of the agent, the task t has no
externalities while the task e creates externalities on the agent’s performance in task t and
the competing agent’s task t as well. The social optimum is obtained by internalizing these
externalities. However, when the agents are engaged in a single tournament, though the
agent can internalize externalities across tasks, the externalities across the agents are
ignored in calculating Nash equilibrium choices of efforts. As a consequence, the
externalities across the agents cannot be internalized, and consequently, a single-prized
tournament cannot achieve the social optimum.
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3.3.2 Multi-prized tournament
As shown in Section 3.1, there is a difficulty in using a single-prized tournament to
achieve the social optimum in the presence of cross-agent externalities (i.e., when β′ 6= 0).
In this Section, we introduce and consider an alternative tournament scheme, a
multi-prized tournament, and examine whether it can be used by the principal to achieve
the social optimum.
A multi-prized tournament consists of two separate ‘tournaments’, to be called an
e-tournament and a t-tournament, for the two agents to compete for. An e-tournament is
for the performance of task e and a t-tournament is designed for the performance of task t.
The winner of each tournament is determined by the relative performance of each task. Let
Be and Bt, respectively, be the prizes for the e-tournament and t-tournament. Again, let
B0 be the base payment to the agent.
1
The two agents play a simultaneous-move game in which they each choose a pair of
efforts (ei, ti) (i = 1, 2) to maximize the expected payoffs. Specifically, each agent i
(i = 1, 2) solves the following problem:
max
ei,ti
B0 +BePr[Ei > Ej] +BtPr[Ti > Tj]− C(ei, ti) (3.3.12)
Let ((em1 , t
m
1 ), (e
m
2 , t
m
2 )) denote a Nash equilibrium pair of choices of efforts by the two
agents when they play the game in this Section. Then, we obtain the following results
summarized in Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 5. For suitably chosen Be and Bt, there exists a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium pair of choices of efforts which involves both agent choosing the same effort
levels em1 = e
m
2 > 0, t
m
1 = t
m
2 > 0.
1In this paper, we focus on the design of Be and Bt. The choice of B0 is done by considering the
participation constraints of the agents once Be and Bt are determined.
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Proof. Note that
Ei > Ej ⇔ j − i < ei − ej
and
Ti > Tj ⇔ ξj − ξi < α(ti − tj) + (β − β′)(ei − ej)
So, the above problem (3.3.12) can be rewritten as follows:
max
ei,ti
BePr[j − i− < ei − ej] +BtPr[ξj − ξi < α(ti − tj) + (β − β′)(ei − ej)]− C(ei, ti)
Let HE(·) be the cdf of the random variable j − i and HT (·) be the cdf of the random
variable ξj − ξi. Then, the above can be rewritten as the following:
max
ei,ti
BeHE[ei − ej] +BtHT [α(ti − tj) + (β − β′)(ei − ej)]− C(ei, ti)
Let H ′E(·) = hE(·) and H ′T (·) = hT (·). Considering symmetric equilibrium choices of
effort levels, we obtain the following
BehE[0] + (β − β′)BthT [0]− ∂C(ei, ti)
∂ei
≤ 0(= 0 if ei > 0) (3.3.13)
αBthT [0]− ∂C(ei, ti)
∂ti
≤ 0(= 0 if ti > 0) (3.3.14)
Following a similar proof strategy to that of Proposition 2, it can be shown that, if Be and
BT are chosen such that BehE[0] + (β − β′)BthT [0] > 0, then there are
em1 = e
m
2 > 0, t
m
1 = t
m
2 > 0 such that
BehE[0] + (β − β′)BthT [0] = ∂C(e
m
i , t
m
i )
∂ei
(3.3.15)
αBthT [0] =
∂C(emi , t
m
i )
∂ti
(3.3.16)
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It may be noted (as in the proof of Proposition 2) that the solution to the system of
equations, (3.3.15) and (3.3.16), is unique.
Proposition 6. There exist Be and Bt such that (e
m
i , t
m
i ) = (e
∗
i , e
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2.
Proof. From proposition 5, there are em1 = e
m
2 > 0, t
m
1 = t
m
2 > 0 satisfying (3.3.15) and
(3.3.16). On the other hand, we have
(1 + β + β′) = Cei(e
∗
i , t
∗
i )
α = Cti(e
∗
i , t
∗
i )
If we set BehE[0] = 1 + 2β
′ and BthT [0] = 1, then,
BehE[0] + (β − β′)BthT [0] = 1 + 2β′ + (β − β′) = 1 + β + β′ > 0, and consequently,
(emi , t
m
i ) = (e
∗
i , e
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2.
Therefore, a multi-prized tournament can be used by the principal to induce the
optimal effort levels from the agents. From the proof of Proposition 3.3.17, the choices of
task-specific ‘prizes’ are:
Bt =
1
hT (0)
for the T task,
Be =
1+2β′
hE(0)
for the E task
It may be noted that Bt > 0, while Be can be positive, or negative, or zero depending on
the parameter β′ of the cross-agent externalities:
β′ ≥ −1/2 if and only if Be ≥ 0.
Note that the sign and size of Be depend on β
′, the parameter capturing the
cross-agent externalities. This can be intuitively understood as a way that the principal
internalizes such externalities. In particular, if such externalities are negative and
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significant, then, in the design of Be, the principal uses a task-specific negative prize to
curb such detrimental activities to achieve optimality. The flexibility of choosing both
prizes, Bt and Be, enables the principal to internalize cross-agent externalities. This is in
sharp contrast to a single-prized tournament where the principal does not have this kind of
flexibility, and, as a consequence, when β′ 6= 0, a single-prized tournament cannot induce
the optimal effort levels from the agents.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing tournaments to induce the optimal
effort levels from competing agents. Agents perform multiple tasks and produce multiple
outputs, and there are inter-agent externalities. We have shown that, in such
environments, a single-prized tournament fails to induce the optimal effort levels from the
agents, while task-specific multi-prized tournaments can be used to induce the agents to
choose the optimal levels of effort.
An implication of our analysis and results is that when agents perform multiple tasks
and produce multiple outputs, and when there are inter-agent externalities, the principal
should not use a single-prized tournament for the purpose of inducing the optimal levels of
efforts from the agents. Single-prized tournament ‘bundles’ the tasks and outputs together,
and such a tournament will not work in general. Instead, the principal should use
task-specific multi-prized tournaments that are tailored for each task. The main reason
that this tournament design works in these contexts is that the principal has extra degrees
of freedom to adjust the sizes of the prizes needed for delegating the right incentives to the
agents.
Our study is theoretical. As we have already noted in the Introduction, there are
several occasions where the contexts similar to those modeled in this paper arise. It would
be interesting to see how our model and theoretical results fare in such occasions.
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